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Introduction

At approximately 4:15 PM on April 29, 1992, in what became known as the
Rodney King Riots, rioting broke out in the city of Los Angeles, primarily in the
South Central portion of the city. For many reasons, the Los Angeles Police
Department was overwhelmed. Governor Pete Wilson and Mayor Tom Bradley
ignored the Mutual Aid system which would have brought responses from
neighboring law enforcement agencies and instead called in the California
National Guard. On the third day of rioting, President George H.W. Bush
federalized the California National Guard and also deployed members of the US
Army and Marine Corps. Though the guardsman, soldiers, and marines often
showed great restraint and bravery, their appearance in Los Angeles
demonstrated the potential problems of using military personnel to police an
American city.
In one particular incident, Marines responding with police to a domestic
dispute were told by one of the officers to “cover me” (i.e. in police terms, be
ready to fire if necessary). The Marines opened fire, discharging over 200 rounds
into the house. To a Marine, that is what is meant by ”cover me,” i.e., lay down a
suppressing round of fire. Luckily, no one including the children inside the house
was hurt or killed. As Maria J. Rasmussen of the Center for Civil-Military
Relations at the Naval Postgraduate Institute pointed out in regard to this

4

incident, “This points to the most important difference between military troops
and police officers. Police officers are trained to respond to crime and violence
with the minimum force necessary to accomplish the task. This principle of
minimum force is alien to a soldier.” 2

On the morning of September 11, 2001, Americans were awakened to the
realities of international terrorism when 19 foreign terrorists associated with the
Al Qaeda network hijacked 4 commercial airliners. Two were crashed into the
twin towers of the World Trade Center in Manhattan and a third into the
Pentagon, while the fourth plane apparently bound for either the Capitol or the
White House crashed into a field in Pennsylvania as it was forced down by the
passengers who knew America was under attack. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) attempted to mount a defense against an attack for which there were no
suitable existing protocols. In the end, authorization to shoot down any hostile
plane was not given to NORAD until 28 minutes after the last plane had crashed.
The order was never communicated to the fighter pilots that had been scrambled
in response to the attack. 3

2

Maria J. M. Rasmussen, “The Military Role in Internal Defense and Security: Some Problems,” (Occasional
paper, The Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 1999), 613.
3
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final Report of National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States-Executive Summary, 2004 (Washington, DC: GPO 2004), 1-2, 7.
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On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina wreaked destruction on large
portions of the Gulf Coast, most notably the state of Louisiana and the city of New
Orleans. Though the response by civilian agencies and military was characterized
by the RAND Corporation as “historically unprecedented,” it is also considered to
have been “tragically inadequate” as civilian organizations were quickly
overwhelmed and the military response was too slow and plagued by problems of
duplicate systems of command and control between the National Guard and
active duty forces. The end result was evacuations as well as search and rescue
missions were delayed. 4

The incidents described here represent the three major areas in which
domestic crises may occur: collective violence that overwhelms local police forces,
international terrorism, and natural disasters. In these cases and many others, we
have had recent examples of the difficulties of conducting coordinated and
coherent responses to high-profile domestic crises. Currently, the United States is
faced with many potential domestic crises that could pose a threat to the lives and
property of Americans, the functioning of the economy and to national security.
The Department of Homeland Security recently identified examples of the
“gravest dangers facing the United States.” These include a bombing using an
improvised explosive device, detonation of an improvised nuclear device, an
attack using a radiation dispersal device, biological attacks (using aerosolized
4

Lynn E. Davis, et al., “Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations,” Report for RAND
Arroyo Center, for the US Army (2007): xi.
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anthrax, plague, food contamination, or a foreign animal disease), chemical attacks
(using blister agents, industrial chemicals, nerve agents, or a chlorine tank
explosion), a major earthquake, a major hurricane, a cyber attack, and an outbreak
of pandemic influenza. 5
In addition, it is quite possible that we will not have the luxury of dealing
with one isolated crisis at a time. Experts recognize the possibility of a hurricane
with a Katrina-like impact striking the US at the same time as a complex national
wildland fire. 6 The RAND Corporation has noted in its study of the Army’s
response to Hurricane Katrina, for example, the possibility of terrorist attacks
occurring simultaneously in different parts of the United States each involving the
use of weapons of mass destruction that could inflict death and destruction like
Hurricane Katrina. 7
But therein lies the problem. The evidence indicates that despite flawed
responses to high profile domestic incidents in the past, the US is still woefully
unprepared for many possible domestic crises. A major cause for this is the lack of
a clear framework, codified in law, regarding the role of the military. This inhibits
the ability of response organizations to plan for crises and may, in fact, hamper the
execution of an effective response.
The lack of such a legal framework means that officials at all government levels
are too often forced to improvise in their use of the military. Decisions which
5

US Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, (Washington, DC: GPO 2008), 7375.
6
Robert Maynes, “FDNY IMTs-Some Background,” With New York Firefighters, no. 1 (2008): 14-15.
7
Davis, et al., “Hurricane Katrina” xi.
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could have important implications in several areas (e.g., for national security, the
continuity of government, the execution of government functions, as well as the
lives, property and civil liberties of the American people) will be made in what
will be referred to here as the “fog of crisis” instead of in prior planning when
there is more information and time available to calmly think through the
consequences of various responses.
Failure to contemplate and define an appropriate role for the armed forces of
the national government in domestic crises of this sort is a serious problem. It is
all the more serious now as these potential crises seem to multiply in character
and scope. This thesis will explore the history of this problem and its recent
implications. It will argue the need for a comprehensive, operational framework,
codified in law, which defines the various alternative uses of all emergency
services, both civilian and military, and is applicable to “all hazards.” I will
attempt to provide a blue-print for what such a framework should look like. More
specifically, I will, in subsequent chapters:
1) Examine the current plans, capabilities and experience of the use of the
military domestically;
2) Review relevant historical cases of domestic usage of the military in the US;
3) Recount some examples of the experiences of other nations regarding the
use of the military domestically; and
4) Analyze some current proposals regarding the role of the military
domestically.
8

I will suggest here that the existing plans and capabilities for the domestic use
of the military are incapable of making America safe and secure while at the same
time preserving individual liberty and civilian supremacy. I will seek to show
that, in the United States, both the historical uses of the military and recent uses
have been inconsistent in their approaches as well as results, often being used as a
“band-aid” on long term problems. I will also try to indicate the ways in which
some responses to crises have been negatively affected by the lack of a clearly
defined domestic role for the military.
An often valuable way to shed light on one country’s problems and to aid in
finding solutions is to look to the experiences of other countries. I will also
undertake that kind of comparative analysis here, while trying to avoid any
oversimplified suggestions that foreign templates for action can be easily
superimposed on the United States.
There have been some significant proposals for redefining the domestic role of
American military forces. I will seek to show that those are fraught with biases
and misconceptions. Finally, I will offer a framework for reform, a new approach,
and suggest the kinds of changes that must accompany this new approach in
order to make America safe and secure while preserving individual liberty and
civilian supremacy.

9

Chapter 1

Deficiencies of the Status Quo

It is extremely important that one understand the current status of
American domestic preparedness, if one is to define an improved role for the
military in dealing with domestic crises. This chapter will examine both the
existing national response plans and the current response capabilities of American
governments. I will also analyze some recent domestic military missions for
examples of the difficulties they illustrate. Finally, I will draw some conclusions
about the status of our ability to keep America safe and secure while preserving
individual liberty and civilian supremacy.

Confusion in the Legal and Organizational Structures of Existing Response Plans
The US government has attempted to establish a framework which will
coordinate the response to a crisis of all relevant organizations, civilian and
military, private and public. 8 Nonetheless, the military’s role, particularly in
regard to law enforcement, is unclear, and the area of command and control is
fraught with problems.

8

US Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, i.
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The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed the
National Response Framework as “a guide to how the Nation conducts allhazards response.” It “describes specific authorities and best practices for
managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to large-scale
terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters.” President George W. Bush
approved this plan. The general principle behind the Framework is that incidents
are managed at the lowest level feasible i.e. first, at the local level by local public
officials. Their efforts are then supplemented by the state (or appropriate
territorial or tribal authorities) which have their own response resources, such as
state military forces, which the Governor commands.
“If a State anticipates that its resources may be exceeded, the Governor can
request assistance from the Federal Government and/or from other States through
mutual aid and assistance agreements such as the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC).” However, “Prior to and during catastrophic
incidents, especially those that occur with little or no notice, the State and Federal
governments may take proactive measures to mobilize and deploy assets in
anticipation of a formal request from the State for Federal assistance… to ensure
that resources reach the scene in a timely manner to assist in restoring any
disruption of normal function of State or local governments.” This will be done in
coordination with other involved entities when possible. 9

9

US Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 1-6, 42.
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If the incident requires a federal response, the Framework spells out the
roles and responsibilities of various federal agencies and how the federal response
will be coordinated. While federal responses may be handled without
coordination by the Secretary of Homeland Security (according to plans such as
the National Search and Rescue Plan and the National Maritime Security Plan), the
Framework states, “When the overall coordination of Federal response activities is
required, it is implemented through the Secretary of Homeland Security consistent
with Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5. Other Federal
departments and agencies carry out their response authorities and responsibilities
within this overarching construct.” The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) Administrator is the “principal advisor on all matters relating to
emergency management,” and assists the Secretary.
The Attorney General, as the country’s chief law enforcement officer, is
responsible for the investigation of terrorist attacks and coordination of law
enforcement to prevent terrorist attacks. In addition, he is responsible for
approving “requests submitted by State Governors pursuant to the Emergency
Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Act for personnel and other Federal law
enforcement support during incidents,” as well as enforcing civil rights laws.
Since the Department of Defense (DOD)’s “primary mission” is national
defense “resources are committed after approval by the Secretary of Defense or at
the direction of the President” except for those elements already authorized to
support civil authorities. DOD assets remain under the command of the Secretary
12

of Defense but they, and state military forces under the Governor, are supposed to
“coordinate closely with response organizations at all levels.” 10 FEMA may call
upon federal agencies to coordinate “Emergency Support Functions,” while
coordinating an incident, the only function designated to be coordinated by DOD
is Public Works and Engineering, where the Army Corps of Engineers would be
used. 11
The Department of Defense created the US Northern Command (US
NOTHCOM) in 2002 “to provide command and control of Department of Defense
(DoD) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil
authorities.” (Its area of responsibility does not include Hawaii, Puerto Rico or the
US Virgin Islands, which fall under the Pacific and Southern Commands,
respectively). US NORTHCOM has few permanently assigned forces so, when
necessary, the President or Secretary of Defense assign forces to it. 12 However on
December 1, 2008 the Pentagon announced it planned to have 20,000 troops inside
the US dedicated to domestic response by 2011. A 4,700-person unit has been
available for this purpose available since October 2008. Interestingly, that unit
would still be scheduled for deployment overseas in 2010 pointing to the
increasing burdens being placed on our nation’s military. 13

10

US Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 24-26.
Ibid, 57-59.
12
US Northern Command, “About US Northern Command,” US Northern Command: Defending Our
Homeland, US Northern Command, http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html (accessed October 8, 2008).
13
Spencer S. Hsu and Ann Scott Tyson, “Pentagon to Detail Troops to Bolster Domestic Security,”
Washington Post, December 1, 2008.
11
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This command’s civil support missions include responding to natural
disasters, terrorist attacks, and counter-drug operations. 14 On February 14, 2008,
NORTHCOM also signed the “Canada-US Civil Assistance Plan” or CAP with
Canada Command (its Canadian equivalent) which allows the two countries
militaries to support in each other “during a civil emergency.” 15
According to NORTHCOM’s website, “An emergency must exceed the
capabilities of local, state, and federal agencies before USNORTHCOM becomes
involved. In most cases, support will be limited, localized and specific.” Once the
incident can be managed by civil authorities, NOTHCOM will withdraw.
NORTHCOM’s website also notes that, “per the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA),
military forces can provide civil support, but cannot become directly involved in
law enforcement.” 16 Although this has been a subject of great legal debate,
according to Coast Guard attorneys Captain Gary Felicetti and Lieutenant
Commander John Luce, “majority opinion including that of the Department of
Defense” currently is that the Act does preclude direct DOD involvement in law
enforcement. 17 There have been, however, many conflicting opinions from
different branches of government at different times in our history and even today.

14

US Northern Command, “About US Northern Command,” US Northern Command: Defending Our
Homeland, US Northern Command, http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html (accessed October 8, 2008).
15
US Northern Command, “U.S. Northern Command, Canada Command establish new bilateral Civil
Assistance Plan,” US Northern Command:Defending Our Homeland,
http://www.northcom.mil/News/2008/021408.html (accessed October 8, 2008).
16
US Northern Command, “About US Northern Command.”
17
Gary Felicetti and John Luce, “The Posse Comitatus Act: Liberation from the Lawyers,” Parameters,
(2004): 94-107.
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The Posse Comitatus Act was passed in 1878 by southern Democrats
angered by the actions taken by federal troops during Reconstruction and
northern Democrats angry over the use of federal troops against striking railroad
workers in Pittsburgh in 1877. 18 It is a fairly short statement and has only been
amended once in 1956 to include the Air Force. It now reads,
“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army
or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” 19
As background, in 1854 Attorney General Cushing had formally defined
“posse comitatus” in the “Cushing Doctrine,”
“The posse comitatus comprises every person in the district or county
above the age of fifteen years whatever may be their occupation, whether
civilians or not; and including the military of all denominations, militia,
soldiers, marines. All of whom are alike bound to obey the commands of a
sheriff or marshal.” 20
According to Felicetti and Luce the meaning of the act was debated at the time of
enactment 21 and since then there have been plenty of conflicting statements on the
Act’s meaning.
Shortly after the Act was passed, President Rutherford B. Hayes sent
federal troops to the territory of New Mexico to quell violence there claiming
while the Act did apply to marshals; the act did not apply to the President. His
18

Reid K Beveridge, “The Bulwark of Civilian Supremacy,” Armed Forces Journal 140 (2002): 23.
Felicetti and Luce, “Liberation from the Lawyers,” 94.
20
Ibid, 96.
21
Ibid, 99.
19
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successor Chester A. Arthur, faced with a similar issue in the territory of Arizona
did not believe Hayes’ interpretation was the meaning of the law and asked the
Congress to amend the law. According to Felicetti and Luce, the Senate Judiciary
Committee responded with a report that “confirmed that the primary evil
addressed by the Posse Comitatus Act was a marshal’s power to call out and
control the Army. The President could, essentially, use troops in Arizona as he
saw fit, provided that military officers maintained command over those forces.” 22
The Act was resurrected in the 1970s by criminal defense attorneys
defending clients who in many of these cases were arrested by law enforcement
officers who had received help from DOD personnel. According to Felicetti and
Luce, “To violate the Act, someone must: (1) willfully (2) use the Army or Air
Force (3) as a posse comitatus or otherwise (4) to execute the laws (5) in a way that
is not authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress.” 23 In these cases the
courts found the Act could not be used to acquit defendants in these cases because
the “to enforce the laws” qualification was not met but did not pronounce rulings
on the other qualifications necessary to prove a violation of the Act. In another
case, a court ruled the Act did not apply to the Navy but Felicetti and Luce point
out, “In doing so, however, this court articulated a broader “spirit” of the Act,
opining that the legislative history showed congressional intent to apply the Act’s
22
23

Ibid, 100.
Ibid, 102
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policy to all armed services.” 24 However, the two Coast Guard lawyers claim the
court came to this conclusion through poorly researched history of the legislative
process behind the act.
Following legislation giving the DOD a role in countering drug smuggling
in the 1982 Defense Authorization Act, the DOD issued regulations defining what
a violation of the PCA was. These regulations were based on the 1970s court
decisions definition of to “execute the laws” and none of the other qualifications,
thus extending the restrictions to the Navy and Marine Corps forces and to DOD
forces outside the US. When legal challenges by drug traffickers arrested by Coast
Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (who are not viewed as bound by the PCA)
on Navy ships appeared in courts, though the courts ruled in favor of the
government; the courts used the DOD regulations and according to Felicetti and
Luce sometimes did not adequately differentiate the regulations from the PCA
itself. In 1988, when Congress gave the DOD even further counter‐drug
responsibilities in the Defense Authorization Act for 1989, DOD kept the
restrictions on those it construed as being covered by the PCA in place and made a
change in language that could be construed as having tightened those
restrictions. 25

24
25

Ibid.
Ibid, 102-104.
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In 2001, the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin outlined how the PCA affects the
use of military personnel for domestic law enforcement duties. According to their
interpretation, functionally the PCA applies to active duty military personnel
(with the exception of the Coast Guard), reservists performing active duty or
training, National Guardsmen in federal service, and civilian employees of DOD
under the command of a military officer. It does not apply to National Guard in
state service. The personnel to which it applies are forbidden under the PCA and
DOD policy from performing interdictions, arrests, apprehensions, stop and frisks,
pursuits, surveillances, as well as serving in undercover, investigatory and
interrogation roles. One exception, however, applies if those roles fall under the
“Military Purpose Doctrine,” (i.e. they primarily serve a military or foreign affairs
purpose).
“National Guard personnel still are precluded,” the Bulletin continues,
“except in exigent circumstances, from direct participation in arresting suspects,
conducting searches, or becoming involved in the chain of custody of evidence…It
must be emphasized that National Guard personnel serve in a support role to the
law enforcement agency.” 26 Whether Guardsmen will carry weapons is a question
for the Adjutant General of the state (the state National Guard commander).
During a disaster relief operation, “active duty military forces rely upon federal,
local, and state law enforcement or the National Guard for force protection. Local

26

David G., Bolgiano, “Military Support of Domestic Law Enforcement Operations,” FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin 70 (2001).
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and state law enforcement has primary responsibility for maintaining law and
order.” 27
Statements by other agencies of the government, however, seem to confuse
the real role of the military in domestic crises. It does not appear that all the
elements of the federal government are reading from the same page. On March 2,
2009, the New York Times reported that in a memo in October, 2001 Deputy
Attorney General John Yoo and Special Counsel Robert J. Delahunty, then both of
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, responded to questions from
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales about whether President Bush could use
the military against terrorism in the US. In that memo, they claimed that military
forces could go as far as conducting raids on terrorist cells, conducting warrantless
searches, and seizing property. Although other legal memos released at the same
time were later repudiated by officials in the executive branch, there is no
indication that the Bush or Obama administrations have repudiated this legal
interpretation. 28
Furthermore, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, in its
final report, noted several problems with planned military responses to domestic
incidents. The report noted that the disaster response roles of the DOD, and
particularly the National Guard and Reserve elements, have not been written into
law. The Commission was also concerned that the DHS and the DOD, “had not

27

Bolgiano, “Military Support of Domestic Law Enforcement.”
Neil A. Lewis, “Memos Reveal Scope of Power Bush Sought in Fighting Terror,” New York Times, March
2, 2009.

28
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have not yet acted adequately to integrate DOD and National Guard leadership
into national preparedness and response planning activities.” In addition, they
mentioned that since the DOD did not accept its earlier recommendation to allow
a Governor, “to direct within his or her state the unified efforts of all military
forces that are responding to domestic contingencies,” there was a lack of a unified
command. 29

Current Response Capabilities
The failed response to Hurricane Katrina raised serious concerns about US
capabilities for handling a catastrophic incident. There are many indications that
neither civilian nor military authorities are capable of dealing with a catastrophic
incident in a satisfactory fashion. There are many reasons for this including a lack
of involvement from ordinary citizens, insufficient funding, shortage of
equipment and training, and the commitment of military resources overseas. One
should add that efforts to increase preparedness are made more difficult by a lack
of a known, clear plan for what the military will do. In addition, as I will attempt
to show, certain trends in the military bring into question whether use of the
military is appropriate for the tasks of law enforcement or force protection in a
domestic operation.
If people are prepared to take care of themselves, it would obviously help
to lessen the burden on response authorities. FEMA recommends that each
29

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a
21st-Century Operational Force, Executive Summary of the Final Report, (Washington, DC: 2008), 18-21.
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household have at its disposal at least 3 days worth of drinking water and nonperishable food. In addition, FEMA states that citizens should be prepared to go
without other basic services such as utilities for a week or longer. All of these
supplies should be stored in one or two containers that are easily portable.
Furthermore, FEMA recommends having an emergency plan and practicing it. 30
Many Americans, however, have not heeded these recommendations at all
and, among those who have made attempts, a significant portion has failed to
follow them fully. A study by the American Red Cross in Greater New York and
New York University's Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response
published in 2006 indicated that while residents of New York City have increased
their personal preparedness, half of New Yorkers do not have emergency supply
kits, and among those who do many of these kits are incomplete. Furthermore,
the study indicated that some of these kits are not portable, most New Yorkers
have not practiced their plans, a majority would attempt to use cars to evacuate
(not advisable in New York City), and a minority would not heed
recommendations by the City to shelter in place or evacuate. 31
The people who would be best positioned to respond to a crisis where help
might be slow in coming would be ordinary members of the community, their
ability to respond immediately could be critical in terms of protecting lives and
property especially in situations where help might be slow in coming. This was
30

FEMA, Are You Ready?, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/basic_preparedness.shtm and
http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/assemble_disaster_supplies_kit.shtm (accessed, April 16, 2009)
31
Center for Catastrophe Preparedness & Response and the American Red Cross in Greater New York, How
Prepared Are We, New York?-Executive Summary, 2006 (New York: CCPR, 2006), 1-5.
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shown by the self-initiated response of ordinary citizens in the Mexico City
earthquake who are credited with saving 800 lives. Unfortunately, being
untrained led to the death of 100 of these spontaneous volunteers.
The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) concept was created in
1985 by the Los Angeles City Fire Department. Since then CERT training has been
adopted and expanded by the Emergency Management Institute and the National
Fire Academy (both part of FEMA). Members are trained in preparing for a
disaster, disaster medical operations (triage, first aid, etc.), light search and rescue,
disaster psychology and team organization. At the end of the course, they are put
through a disaster simulation. FEMA made the materials available in 1993, 32 but
the information provided by Citizen Corps an umbrella organization of citizen
preparedness groups under which CERT is found indicates there are many
localities that are possibly still without CERTs. 33 Jeremy Damren, CERT
coordinator for the Maine Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) given that
CERT teams volunteer their time and labor, and that there are large potential
benefits from CERT involvement, that CERTs should be expanded. He notes in
Maine where there are relatively few disasters that it is necessary to involve

32

Citizen Corps, CERT: Community Emergency Response Team: About CERT, Citizen Corps,
http://www.citizencorps.gov/cert/about.shtm (accessed April 16, 2009).
33
Citizen Corps, CERT: Community Emergency Response Team: Directory of Community Emergency
Response Team Programs by State, Citizen Corps,
https://www.citizencorps.gov/cc/CertIndex.do?submitByState (accessed April 16, 2009). It should be noted
that the information here is inexact because the programs listed there have chosen to be listed.
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CERTs in exercises. Finally, he points out that “we do not have a whole lot of
funding for CERTs, so they need to be self sufficient.” 34
The first governmental authorities to respond to an incident would be local
and then state authorities. While these authorities routinely respond to
emergencies on a daily basis, and have developed response capabilities for largescale incidents, recently it has begun to appear their ability to respond may be
under stress.
Some local law enforcement agencies have attempted to prepare for civil
unrest since the 1980s with the “Field Force Concept” “pioneered by the MetroDade, Florida Police Department. That approach involves specially training and
equipping select patrol officers who could be mobilized to deal with such unrest.
The Suffolk County, New York Police Department (SCPD) created its own Mobile
Field Force in 1993 but wound up using them not for riots but for other large
incidents like aircraft crashes and mutual aid to New York City on September
11th. After the 9/11 attacks, the SCPD revitalized and revamped the unit with
new equipment, new training and a new name: the Crisis Action Team (CAT).
The CAT is intended to provide both civil unrest and Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) response capabilities, as one incident could involve both of
those problems. This Field Force format has also been used to form the Suffolk
Coordinated Law Enforcement Response Group (SCLERG) involving 29 local,

34

Jeremy Damren, email message to the author, March 30, 2009.
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state, and federal agencies in the county, which can respond to incidents both in
and outside the county. 35
Currently, however, many local police forces are under fiscal strain. A 2003
survey indicated that 1 in 4 could be forced to cut positions–this may be a
conservative estimate in light of the current financial crisis if insufficient aid is
delivered to local governments. To add to the problem, police forces are now
being given homeland security responsibilities, which are making it “harder to
meet normal public safety duties in 1 in 4 cities of all sizes and in more than half of
cities of 100,000 plus in population.” Mobilization of National Guard and Reserve
units has also reduced police ranks, as many police personnel also serve in those
units. In addition, the movement of FBI agents from jobs working with local law
enforcement to counter-terrorism has also added to the demands on local forces. 36
At the same time, federal grant programs to local enforcement have
suffered. From the inception of Local Law Enforcement Assistance Block Grants
(LLEABG) in 1996 until the program was replaced by the Justice Assistance Grant
Program in 2004, the amount awarded under LLEABG decreased from $424
million to $115 million. 37 By 2007 the JAG allocations were $304 million (higher
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than LLEABG allocation in 2004 but still lower than in 1996) but in 2008
allocations were cut by 65% to $107 million, an amount lower than 2004. 38
It has also been noted that despite the proliferation of law enforcement
units specially armed and trained to deal with heavily armed criminal suspects,
law enforcement may not have the capability to deal with certain types of
incidents. For example, recent cases involving armored vehicles in Colorado,
where a gunman drove an armored bulldozer through a town, and San Diego
where an individual stole a National Guard tank, overwhelmed local response
capabilities. In both cases, the police were unable to stop the armored vehicles and
were unable to take action against the suspects until the vehicles became disabled
on their own. 39
Research by the RAND Corporation has indicated that state and local
agencies increased terrorism preparedness after 9/11; however, there are concerns
that this may have stretched agencies “too thin.” The research also indicated that
these agencies were not working with the private sector and there were
disconnects between different types of agencies which hamper integrated
responses. State and local agencies also had differing expectations about the role
of the military and National Guard, which raises questions as to whether they also
might be planning under different assumptions. Agencies cited limited budgets
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and other competing priorities as reasons they have not increased terrorism
preparedness. These agencies were also looking to DHS for more funding and
assistance in other areas. 40
If these local agencies are overwhelmed, the governor can request
assistance from many federal civilian agencies that are also capable of responding
to incidents. But it appears there may be overlap and duplication in the
procedures for this as well as possible problems with funding and transparency.
In addition to “headquarters-level” and “regional support structures,” the
National Response Framework highlights a number of federal assets that can be
utilized in field support, coordinated by a Joint Field Office. Incident
Management Assistance Teams (IMATs) can help with the coordination of a
response and provide situational awareness. Mobile Emergency Response
Support (MERS) can provide telecommunications and power generation to help
coordinate the response. Hurricane Liaison Teams (HLTs) facilitate “information
exchange between the National Hurricane Center in Miami and other National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration components, as well as Federal, State,
tribal, and local government officials.”
There are also 28 Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams made up of
“local emergency services personnel [structured] into integrated response task
forces...Complete with the necessary tools, equipment, skills, and techniques,
[which] can be deployed by FEMA to assist State, tribal, and local governments in
40
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rescuing victims of structural collapse incidents or to assist in other search and
rescue missions.” 41 In addition, there is the National Disaster Medical System
(NDMS) to provide medical assistance to affected populations. However,
commanders of the civilian Disaster Medical Teams (DMATs), which are part of
the NDMS, have made accusations that the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) has been “systematically weakening” the DMATs as it strengthens
the new uniformed US Public Health Service (PHS) Commissioned Corps Health
and Medical Response (HAMR) teams. Some suspect that this change results from
the belief that the HAMR teams will be less likely to speak out about problems––
an accusation that HHS officials deny. 42
On the military side, a response can come from units of the state military
forces such as the National Guard, as well as reserve or active duty federal
military forces. Questions have been raised, however, about the ability of these
units to mount an effective and suitable response. The National Guard figures
prominently here as state governors can deploy their National Guard forces even
if they are not requesting federal civilian assistance. In addition, as mentioned
earlier, while in state service, they are less bound by the various interpretations of
Posse Comitatus Act than federal military forces.
The National Guard has developed a number of units for homeland
security missions. The Joint Force Headquarters-State and Joint Task Force State
help provide command and control. The Civil Support Teams can assist civilian
41
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responders by providing consultation and assessment as well as helping
coordinate responses at suspected Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
incidents. CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) responds and
offers operational capabilities at Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or
high yield Explosive (CBRNE) incidents. National Guard Reaction Force
(NGRF)’s mission is to “provide force protection and security for WMD Civil
Support Teams and… (CERFP) Teams.” Expeditionary Medical Support
(EMEDS) can provide rapid medical response for humanitarian relief, wartime
contingencies and disaster response. The Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System
(MAFFS) assists the Forest Service with wildland fires. 43
Critics note that US military involvement overseas has drawn away
resources that might otherwise be available for use at home (such as National
Guard units) making it difficult to mount an effective response to a domestic
incident. “Remote areas of several states had air medical service only because of
the Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) service,” but these units are
increasingly being deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Alaska found out its “last
MAST unit would be deployed July 1 [2008].” 44 In February of 2008, The
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves released a report claiming, “The
United States military is not prepared for a catastrophic attack on the country, and
National Guard forces do not have the equipment or training they need for the
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job.” The Commission also acknowledged that, given the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, there is no choice but to use reserve elements overseas. 45
This has led some to call for study of using the little-known State Defense
Forces (SDF) or State Guard Units possessed by “approximately 22 states and
Puerto Rico,” which cannot be federalized and sent overseas. However, advocates
of this approach note that currently “SDF units operate with little fanfare on shoe
string budgets.” 46
The suitability of the US military for domestic missions, particularly those
involving law enforcement, is also brought into question by potentially disturbing
social and ideological trends in the US military. Taken individually these trends
may not be consequential, but taken together they indicate a serious need to
evaluate what role the military should play domestically. While the officer corps
of the US military has traditionally been politically non-partisan in public, survey
data indicate the portion of officers openly identifying themselves as Republicans
has approximately doubled to two-thirds of the officer corps, a trend not seen in
civilian opinion leaders. In addition, Paul Gronke and Peter Fever noted while
over two-thirds of the officers surveyed in 1998 said the military would “rarely or
never” avoid following civilian orders it disagreed with, “Nearly one fifth of elite
military officers expect the military to try to avoid orders from civilians some of
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the time, and not an insignificant 5 percent think the military will do so most or all
of the time.” 47
In addition, evidence suggests that with the end of conscription, members
of the armed forces tend to feel that military culture is increasingly different from
civilian culture. They also believe that military culture is superior to civilian
culture and the military could help instill proper values in Americans. This
alienation is strengthened by the fact that many officers live in military base
communities that resemble “small town America” and that military officers are
more religious (and more likely to believe the Bible is the literal word of God) than
the rest of the society.
Finally, there are some in the armed forces, mainly in the Marines and
special operations units, who are advocates of a theory known as “Fourth
Generation Warfare.” This theory posits that future warfare will be asymmetric
warfare not between nations but between civilizations. These believers feel that
the US must be prepared to defend Western civilization by creating small elite
units with a “warrior culture” to fight the enemy which, according to Fourth
Generation theorists like William Lind, may very well include operations inside
the US against civilian groups. Their justification is the “abandonment of JudeoChristian, Western culture and values here at home” which they believe will cause
internal disorder in the US.
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While this is still considered to be a minority viewpoint, the importance
placed on the threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups to American
homeland may very well increase support for the Fourth Generation theory 48

Recent Domestic Military Missions
Military units have been and are currently involved in many missions in
support of domestic civil authorities, many of which were to deal with long term
security problems or natural disasters. At the end of July 2008, the 6,000 National
Guardsman sent to the Mexican Border in 2006 to combat illegal immigration were
withdrawn despite requests from border states that they stay. 49 In 2007, according
to the New York Times, about 300 uniformed and armed New York State National
Guardsmen were still patrolling airports and railroad stations in the New York
City area (after 9/11 there were approximately 2,000 soldiers on such duty). 50 In
August 2008, almost three years after Katrina, the New York Times reported that
there were still 300 Louisiana National Guardsmen assisting the New Orleans
Police Department in patrolling the city. They were initially sent in 2006 after
New Orleans’ mayor requested them to help quell violent crime there. 51 In 2008
alone, the US Northern Command assisted with the responses to the Midwestern
floods, the California wildfires, and Hurricanes Ike, Gustav, and Hanna. 52
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Conclusion
This examination suggests that current plans and existing capabilities
cannot be counted on to keep America safe and secure in a domestic crisis while
preserving civil liberties and civilian supremacy. Existing response plans,
particularly those related to law enforcement, lack consistency because of
confusion in their legal and organizational structures and this confusion raises
many issues that call into question the country’s ability to respond to domestic
crisis. In addition, the domestic missions tasked to our military are highly varied
and fit no appropriate model of what military involvement should be.
When major domestic crises occur, the consequences of these failures may
quickly become apparent. The lack of a clearly defined role for the military is both
part of the problem and, at the same time, an impediment to improving
preparedness.
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Chapter 2
Historical Uses of the Military
One can better understand the current debate about the use of military
forces in a domestic crisis with the help of some background on the roles they
have played in the past and the variety of impacts they have had. Federal military
forces have been used to deal with a wide array of situations since 1794, when
Washington first led state militia units he had called into federal service during
the Whiskey Rebellion. In that first instance, the governor of Pennsylvania had
refused to call up his own militia to suppress a rebellion in the western part of the
state over the imposition of a federal excise tax on whiskey.
Federal troops have been used to help stop Aaron Burr’s vague plot to take
over portions of US territory, to curtail slave rebellions, to prevent incursions on
Cherokee land and, when that failed, to help remove the Cherokee to lands west
of the Mississippi. When the Patriot movement (1837-8) and later the Fenian
Brotherhood (1866) attempted invasions of Canada, federal troops were used to
secure the areas around the Canadian border. 53 On and around the Mexican
border, they have been used against attempted rebellions, incursions by Mexican
irregular forces and to prevent the entry into this country of illegal immigrants,
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drugs 54 and terrorists. 55 Federal troops have also been used to end a conflict over
the constitution of the State of Rhode Island (Dorr’s Rebellion), reassert federal
authority over the Mormons in Utah, preserve order during the Bloody Kansas
period, and to stop John Brown’s raid at Harpers Ferry. After the Civil War, the
military was tasked with overseeing the Reconstruction of the South. It would
also play a role in preventing lawlessness and allowing the administration of
justice in the Old West. 56 In a more negative fashion, soldiers were involved in the
suppression of labor unions, anti-war groups and minority groups, such as the
internment of Japanese-Americans in World War II. They have also been sent to
restore order during urban riots, 57 to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the
country, 58 and to provide relief after disasters. 59
Some of these incidents, particularly some of those from the 18th and 19th
centuries have little direct bearing on the current debate, except to show the wide
array of contingencies that have occurred in a large and diverse federal republic
like the United States and been addressed, at least in part, by federal military
forces. As such, they will not be discussed here as that discussion could fill
volumes. Instead, this chapter will concentrate on those cases that usefully inform
the current debate on the domestic role of the military.
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Much of the current debate refers to the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) which,
as the previous chapter explains, is now, despite legal opinions that muddy the
picture, accepted by many as restricting the use of the military in domestic law
enforcement. In analyzing that debate, this chapter will:
•

Review the uses of the military, during Reconstruction and the 1877
Pittsburgh Railroad Riots, which led to the passage of the act in 1878.

•

Analyze uses of the military in the suppression of organized labor,
anti-war groups and racial minorities, arguably the most troubling
precedents relevant to the current debate.

•

Review use of federal troops to enforce racial integration during the
civil rights era.

•

Address some of the operational difficulties found with the use of
the military to keep order during urban riots and to provide disaster
relief, which, I will argue, are due in part to the lack of a clear role
for the military.

•

Address the use of the military during operations that have no
foreseeable end, e.g., their use in the “War on Drugs” and the effort
to curb the flow of illegal immigrants and potential terrorists across
the Mexican border.
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Uses of the Military During Reconstruction
In 1867, the military was given responsibility for overseeing the
Reconstruction of the former Confederate States (with the exception of Tennessee
which had been “reconstructed” earlier but would still see Federal military
involvement). Until these states were fully “reconstructed” (Georgia was the last
in 1870) the military was in full control, and afterwards the military remained a
presence until 1877. During this time, the military monitored elections to ensure
blacks could vote, 60 set up state governments that had blacks as members 61 , and
broke up violent conflicts between blacks and whites. They arrested “upward of
600” “known or suspected” members of the Ku Klux Klan in South Carolina under
the Ku Klux Klan Act which allowed military authorities to take action to suppress
the Klan, and at times suspended civil governments during disturbances,
instituting military rule. 62 In essence, the military attempted to protect the rights
of a relatively powerless group, African-Americans, but at the expense of
federalism, civilian supremacy and the civil liberties of southern whites.
Anger among southern Democrats about these actions contributed to the
passage of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) in 1878 while anger among Northern
Democrats about the use of the Army against the unions involved in the 1877
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Pittsburgh Railway Riots contributed to their support of the bill. 63 At the time it
was passed the PCA stated,
“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army as a posse
comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” 64

Suppression of Organized Labor, Anti-War Groups, and Racial Minorities
A quite disturbing chapter of American history involves the use of the
military against organized labor, anti-war groups and racial minorities. Despite
the passage of the PCA, federal troops were still used to break strikes with only
one party line objection from Congress and that objection did not cite the PCA. In
suppressing labor, they acted along with law enforcement, state militia/National
Guard, and “company police” (who were hired by the companies to protect their
interests and often granted police powers). Political scientist Robert J. Goldstein
notes, intervention may have been necessary at times, “and in many cases such
forces limited themselves to the protection of men who wished to continue
working. However, in all too many cases police [,] militia and federal troops acted
so brutally and one-sidedly that they clearly acted as handservants of the
companies involved.” 65
In cases as late as 1922, there was no reasonable justification for troops to be
sent during peaceful strikes, except possibly to intimidate strikers. According to
63

Beveridge, “The Bulwark of Civilian Supremacy,” 23.
Felicetti and Luce, “Liberation from the Lawyers,” 96, 101.
65
Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, 14-16.
64

37

Goldstein, in Goldfield, Nevada troops were kept in place “although federal
investigators reported the troops were not needed and had been secured so
mineowners could break the union” using illegal methods. In fact, in some cases
like the 1903 strike in Morenci, Arizona, the strikers were merely asking for labor
laws to be enforced and troops were sent against them. 66
Not only were federal troops used illegitimately but the methods they used
were often illegitimate, brutal and/or contemptuous of state and local authorities
including local law enforcement. Furthermore, at times they exceeded their
granted authority. Indiscriminate arrests were a favored practice. During an 1899
strike by the Western Federation of Miners in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho those arrested
included “a large number of Populist party leaders, including a local deputy
sheriff. The Populist county sheriff and three Populist county commissioners was
[were] removed from office.” 67 This case was investigated by the House Military
Affairs Committee and the report was split on party lines with only the
Democratic minority objecting to the actions taken after the initial deployment of
troops (which they regarded as legal) as, “reprehensible, violative of the liberty of
the citizen, and totally unwarranted by the laws and Constitution of the United
States.” They never cited the PCA at all. 68
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During the American Railway Union Strike of 1894, troops were sent to
several states without the request of the respective governors, “Populist Gov.
David White of Colorado, protested that the federal government was ‘waging an
active war in Colorado without any declaration thereof by the United States, or
notice or knowledge thereof by state authorities, and utterly in violation of the
law.’” In Hammond, Indiana where troops “indiscriminately opened fire on
citizens, the Mayor protested, ‘I would like to know by what authority U.S. troops
come here and shoot our citizens without the slightest warning.’” 69 In the early
1920s there was a conflict between mine operators (who in this case dominated the
state and local authorities) and the United Mine Workers (UMW). This conflict
ended with the defeat of the UMW at the Battle of Blair Mountain during which
the US Army Air Service attempted to drop pipe bombs on the unionists. 70
According to Goldstein, in 1917, in the buildup to World War I, the Army
“was authorized to sternly suppress acts committed with seditious intent,” 71 and
according to Felicetti and Luce, “the Secretary of War unilaterally instituted a
‘Direct Access Policy,’” that essentially reinstated the Cushing Doctrine for over 4
years” allowing local officials to use the military to oppress workers. 72 According
to Goldstein, military intelligence spied on “the IWW [the Industrial Workers of
the World], the SPA [Socialist Party of America], the pacifist Fellowship of
Reconciliation, and the National Civil Liberties Bureau.” Although they were
69
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“instructed to confine their activities to preserving ‘law and order’ and to
protecting ‘life and property’” the military investigated a governor, wound up
breaking the IWW in the West by “raids on IWW headquarters, breaking up
meetings, arresting and detaining hundreds of strikers under military authority,
without any declaration of military law and instituting a general reign of terror
against the IWW.” They continued to do this in some areas until 1921 (the war
ended in 1918). 73
After the war, the Red Scare was used as an excuse for the same type of
tactics used for decades before and during the war. During the steel strike of 1919,
which was associated with the American Federation of Labor, “Federal troops and
military intelligence agents…placed Gary [Indiana] under ‘modified martial law’
barring public assemblies, and regularly raided homes of alleged ‘Reds’ in the
middle of the night.” 74 According to Felicetti and Luce, “few in power appeared
to care.” 75
In another related case, General MacArthur secretly trained his troops in
riot control and despite orders to the contrary from the Secretary of War, led his
troops against the Bonus Marchers. 76
Federal military forces were also used against racial minorities. In military
intelligence’s study of the 1919 urban race riots, they spied on moderate groups
such as the Urban League. In the same year, when black sharecroppers attempted
73
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to organize in Arkansas violence broke out between the blacks and sheriff’s
deputies after which a white mob attacked the blacks. Federal troops were sent
and “arrested several hundred blacks.” 77 During World War II, Japanese
Americans on the West Coast including those who were US citizens were interred
in military camps run by the military acting under an Executive Order. 78
This wide range of federal involvements demonstrates the possibility of
using federal troops in the support of specific interests, not necessarily the
interests of the nation as a whole, and at the expense of the rights of other groups,
normally those with less power such as workers, racial minorities and those
whose political opinions run counter to those in power.

Forcible Integration
During the civil rights era, many state governments in the South opposed
the Supreme Court decision in Brown vs. Board of Education requiring the
integration of schools. In response, federal troops were used by Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy to help forcibly integrate the schools.
When nine black students tried to enter Central High School in Little Rock
in 1957, despite Mayor Woodrow W. Mann’s claim that his police could control
the angry mob of whites outside the school, Gov. Orval Faubus sent in the
Arkansas National Guard which proceeded to prevent the nine students from
entering. Mayor Mann then requested that Eisenhower send federal troops.
77
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Eisenhower heeded the request 79 and sent the 1,000 riot-trained troops from the
101st Airborne who took control of the school and escorted the students to class. 80
When James Meredith tried to enter the University of Mississippi in 1962
under escort of US Marshals, Meredith and the marshals were stopped by state
troopers under orders from Governor Ross Barnett. So President Kennedy
responded by sending more Deputy US Marshals along with deputized Border
Patrol agents (bringing the number of federal law enforcement officers to 538).
When the officers came under attack with bricks, buckshot and Molotov cocktails
by an angry mob, President Kennedy federalized members of the Mississippi
National Guard and then later a company of Military Police. The federal forces
never fired on the mob although the mob was finally dispersed by the sound of
the Military Police locking and loading their carbines. 81 The decision to use
federal troops in these situations indicates the complex interplay of the competing
demands of enforcing federal court decisions regarding the right to equal
education, federalism/states rights, and civil supremacy. Decisions in such
complex areas are arguably not best made when the crisis is already at hand.

Riots and Disaster Relief
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Federal military forces have also been used to restore order during riots
and to provide disaster relief and there has been a history of operational problems
when they have served in those roles. In the 1943 Detroit Riot, “Municipal and
state authorities claim that the accessibility of these troops had been
misrepresented to them or, at the very least, that they had not been correctly
informed about the procedures necessary to obtain federal aid in the suppression
of civil disturbance.” 82 In the wake of the 1967 Detroit riot, President Johnson was
accused by Governor George Romney of “playing politics with the situation” in
regard to a request for the deployment of federal troops. 83 In the 1992 Los
Angeles riots, state-controlled National Guard units were taking requests/orders
from the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) but once they were federalized
they fell under the authority of an active duty military general who,
uncomfortable with law enforcement missions, subsequently denied 90% of
requests from the Sheriff’s Department. 84
Response to natural disasters has traditionally been a responsibility of the
National Guard in state service. However, the active duty federal military has in
the past tried taking command of the situation, which has led to conflict with the
National Guard. After Hurricane Andrew in 1992, for example, the Army chief of
staff sent a Lieutenant General to Florida who then proceeded to claim that he was
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in command, something that the commander of the Florida National Guard
rebuffed. 85 Research of the active-duty military’s relief efforts in the 1800s
indicates that the military responses varied from situation to situation and were
often hampered by “localism” and a lack of financial support from Congress. 86 In
these cases, operational problems could have been avoided by a clear and defined
role for the military.

Missions with No Foreseeable End
There has also been a recent trend in the assignment of the military to
missions that have no foreseeable end; e.g., drug interdiction and patrolling the
border for illegal immigrants and terrorists. The Reagan Administration ordered
the use of the military for drug interdiction which was subsequently approved by
Congress in legislation that also allowed the military to be used for tariff and
immigration enforcement, otherwise normally civilian functions. 87
In 1996, over 3,000 National Guardsmen along with active duty Department
of Defense elements such as the US Navy were involved in counter-drug
operations, mostly centered on high tech surveillance leading to interdiction by
civilian law enforcement and the Coast Guard. When this approach did not
produce the results Senator Bob Dole wanted, he was considering “giving the US
military the lead responsibility for stopping the flow of illegal drugs.” This was
85
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despite the fact that interdiction seemed to have no effect on either consumption
or the supply of drugs available. Even military officers in charge of these high
tech operations said that money could be better spent on law enforcement agents
and, as Richard J. Newman of US News and World Report pointed out; the most
effective way to reduce the importation of illegal drugs would be to get Americans
to stop using them. 88
Military activity has been common on the Mexican Border where there have
been deployments to stop the flow of drugs, illegal immigrants and potential
terrorists across the border. In 1997, it was reported that the Department of
Defense had suspended the use of federal military forces on the Mexican Border
after the controversial shooting of a local teenager by a US Marine patrol. 89 In
2003, The New York Times reported that US Special Forces, Army Rangers, Marines
and unmanned aerial drones had been deployed to the Mexican border to combat
drug trafficking and terrorism. 90 At the end of July 2008, the 6,000 National
Guardsman sent to Mexican Border in 2006 to combat illegal immigration were
withdrawn despite requests from border states that they stay. This move was
criticized by The New York Times as a case of President Bush claiming a “false
victory” because the border was not secure. 91
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In a related case, in 1989, President George H. W. Bush proposed using
federalized National Guard or regular military personnel in the District of
Columbia if local police did not reduce the District’s growing murder rate. 92
These cases show a proclivity of American politicians when faced with a longterm, complex domestic problem to “send in the troops” to take care of it, and as a
result militarize a situation not normally included among the kinds of operations
for which the armed forces are suited or trained.

Conclusions
These cases paint a picture of the domestic use of federal military forces in a
wide range of circumstances and with a wide variety of effects. Use of the military
has been at times a force for good to protect constitutional rights, ensure the
administration of justice and assist the threatened and the powerless. At other
times, however, it has been a force to reassert the role of the powerful at the
expense of the less powerful. Sometimes it has been a resource to back up the
limited capabilities of the states; at other times, the military has posed a threat to
federalism by muddying or corroding the relationship between federal, state and
local authorities. In addition, the domestic deployment of federal military forces
has often proved operationally difficult due to a lack of clearly defined role for the
military and indicates a proclivity by some politicians to give the military illdefined missions without any foreseeable end, using the military as a figurative
92
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“band-aid,” instead of getting to the roots of the problems. Furthermore, these
events call into question the effectiveness of the Posse Comitatus Act as a control
on military domestic operations, as the Act seems to have been completely ignored
in some instances and yet no one has ever been prosecuted under the Posse
Comitatus Act. 93
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Chapter 3
Lessons from Abroad
While the previous chapter showed the wide variety of ways that the
United States has used its military domestically, examining the experiences of
other countries provides a broader context for that history, as other countries have
shown a greater range of roles for the military and a wider variety of subsequent
effects.
The domestic role of the military as part of the greater subject of civilmilitary relations has been an issue in societies for millennia, as evidenced by the
quote from 1st and 2nd century Roman satirist Juvenal “Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?” (Who will guard the guards themselves?). There is a large body of
literature on civil-military relations in specific countries or regions, particularly
about Latin America, where the creation of military/constabulary forces by the US
in some countries from 1898-1934, combined with the conquistador military
tradition, “spawned military dictatorships.” 94
While it would be interesting and no doubt useful to do case studies of
specific domestic activities of foreign militaries, the sheer number of variables
involved would make it difficult, in a work of this size, to draw any strong
conclusions relevant to the current situation in United States. At different times,
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and places, there have been a wide variety of economic, political and social
conditions. In fact, until recently, democracy was a “rare political format.” 95
There have also been variations in the degree of civilian control of the
military (if any). As technology has changed, so have the relative capabilities of
the police, military and other groups (including private citizens) to exercise
coercive force. Finally, there have been many variations in how the security forces
of a country are organized and utilized. Many countries have national police
forces while others do not; other countries have paramilitary forces charged with
policing such as gendarmerie along with civilian police, while others employ their
military in police roles. It has been recognized that the primarily state-controlled
National Guard units of the US are a “uniquely American organization.” 96
Thus, this chapter will mainly draw from the work of political scientists
and others who have done extensive comparative studies of the subject and have
promoted general theories on the domestic role of the military backed up with
specific relevant cases when practical. Specifically, it will address the following
issues:
•

The characteristics of military forces as compared with police
agencies.

•

How different countries utilize their security forces.
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•

The effects of different utilization patterns.

•

The effects of the changing security environment on that utilization.

•

The implications of international experience for the domestic use of
the military in this country.

Military Forces Compared with Police Agencies.
Scholarly works usually differentiate between the roles of the police and the
military. What are the characteristics of each type of organization that lead to this
differentiation?
Police are generally assigned the duty of preserving public order
domestically. Police often act in a service capacity, responding to car accidents
and other emergencies, providing first aid to civilians, dealing with the mentally
ill, assisting the elderly and children in crossing streets etc. Police, including
paramilitary units such as gendarmerie, are usually not heavily armed, instead
rely on close connections to the community to perform their duties, and thus are
often drawn from and live in the area. 97 Importantly, despite their ability to
influence political figures, the police usually do not; often they simply carry out
the commands of those figures. 98 Operationally, police are taught to perform their
duties while exerting the least amount of force necessary. 99 This “law
enforcement mentality” is considered, by some authors, to be necessary for
97
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military forces in operations dealing with civilians in potentially hostile
environments where they do not have the option of relying on a large advantage
in firepower. 100
On the other hand, the military is traditionally concerned with foreign
threats. By virtue of where they are stationed, they are usually detached from
civilians. Personnel are recruited nationwide and have their billets consistently
shifted to avoid them making close connections to civilians 101 Political scientist
Paul Shemella has pointed out that their traditional missions “are high-profile,
large-unit affairs, conducted by heavily armed combatants in an environment
where everyone is a target…[which involve] little civil-military interaction.” 102
Maria Rasmussen of the Naval Postgraduate School notes that the “principle of
minimum force is alien to a soldier.” 103 As an example of the difference between a
“law enforcement mentality” and a purely military “warrior mentality” where
levels of force are not an issue, one only needs to think back to the example from
the Los Angeles Riots in the introduction to this thesis where the military use of
the phrase “cover me” could easily have resulted in a tragedy.

How Different Countries Utilize Their Security Forces

100

Paul Shemella, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” in Who Guards the
Guardians (see note 2), 137.
101
Welch, Military Role and Rule, 10.
102
Shemella, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions,” 137.
103
Rasmussen, “The Military Role,” 13.

51

How then do countries employ these significantly different organizations,
each of which has the ability to use force? As mentioned earlier, there are many
variations, however Paul Shemella has developed five “Macro Roles” which can
be used to categorize the ways in which different countries utilize their military
forces. These are outlined in the following table.
Table 1. "Macro Roles for the Armed Forces" 104

War Fighter

Defender

Peacekeeper

United States
Japan
Canada
Russia
Taiwan
Sweden
Britain
Jordan
Argentina
China
South Korea
Bangladesh
France
Kuwait
Mongolia
Source: Shemella, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions,” 126.

Firefighter

Police Officer

Peru
Botswana
Mexico
Georgia
Brazil

Indonesia
Honduras
Albania
Togo
Bolivia

Both “War Fighters” and “Defenders” may use their forces for other roles,
but their main focus is on maintaining the option of offensive force and defending
themselves from attacks by neighbors respectively. “Peacekeepers” focus their
militaries on peace operations abroad. 105
For our purposes, “Fire Fighters” and “Police Officer” countries are the
most important. Shemella claims, “Fire Fighters” have no real external threats and
thus involve their militaries in a variety of domestic missions such as “developing
infrastructure and crisis management…Like real fire fighters, the military forces of
these countries are used in missions for which no other organizations are
available.” 106 They may carry out counter drug enforcement, fight insurgencies
and civil wars but do not carry out “regular law enforcement.” They tend to
104
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cooperate with civilian law enforcement when the two types of organizations
interact. Though almost all governments require their militaries to engage in
“Military Support to Civil Authorities” (MSCA), Shemella notes that “the extent to
which military forces are used in this role and the duration of that usage are what
distinguishes military and police forces from each other, and the fire fighter
countries from all the others.” 107 “Police Officer” countries like the name suggests
make domestic law enforcement the primary focus of their militaries and the
regular police are usually supplanted by the military. 108
Shemella further shows, in the table that follows, what kind of “micro
roles” the armed forces, coast guard, and police are assigned in each of these types
of countries:
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Table 2. Modified Version of “Micro Roles of Armed Forces and Law Enforcement” 109 110

Macro Role

Army

Navy

Air Force

Coast Guard
Augments
Navy for
combat
operations &
conducts
maritime law
enforcement
Augments
Navy for
combat
operations &
conducts
maritime law
enforcement

Police Force

War Fighter

Ground
component in
joint warfare

Maritime
component in
joint warfare

Air
component in
joint warfare

Defender

Ground
component in
joint warfare

Maritime
component in
joint warfare

Air
component in
joint warfare

Peacekeeper

Conducts
peace support
operations
(PSOs) ashore

Conducts
PSOs in
coastal and
riverine areas

Provides
logistic
support to
ground
troops

Conducts
maritime law
enforcement
at home

Enforces the
law at home
& trains
indigenous
police during
PSOs

Firefighter

Conducts
military
support to
civil
authorities
(MSCA)

Conducts
MSCA in
coastal and
riverine areas

Provides air
service to
remote areas

Conducts
maritime law
enforcement

Enforces the
law at home

Conducts
maritime law
enforcement

Augments the
Army in
domestic law
enforcement

Provides
logistic
Police Officer
support to
ground
troops
Source: Shemella, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions,” 129.
Enforce the
law in rural
areas and
cities

Enforces the
law in coastal
and riverine
areas

Enforces the
law at home

Enforces the
law at home

Effects of Different Utilization Patterns
Political scientists also have determined several effects associated with
these different utilization patterns. If multiple security forces are employed in the
same capacity or if the roles keep changing, it can increase the cost of maintaining
those security forces. In addition, domestic uses of the military can negatively
109
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affect the strength of both the police and the military. Domestic deployments can
also negatively influence civil-military relations and increase the possibility of
military intervention in politics.
If security forces are given duplicative roles, or their roles are not stable, the
cost to society can be increased. If duplicate services are provided by different
organizations, funds may be wasted on a perpetual basis because roles tend to
become permanent. However, if the military’s roles are consistently shifted the
cost to society increases due to the inefficiencies of consistently changing
direction. 111
Countries which use the military primarily for domestic law enforcement
(the “Police Officers” in the parlance above), risk weakening the actual domestic
police permanently. Shemella states,
“Regular police officers in these countries are weak, and the use of the
military in their place only makes them weaker. When armed forces are
used in this way, it is very difficult for them to do anything else. Police
officers are among the most unstable countries in the world; their
governments tend to remain convinced that a shift of military forces away
from law enforcement would create even more instability.” 112
Use of the military in “non-traditional” roles or, in US military parlance,
“operations other than war,” (e.g. low intensity conflicts, law enforcement,
humanitarian operations, and combating terrorism) may weaken the military’s
ability in its “traditional” role of fighting wars. In these operations, military
personnel interact with civilians regularly which ideally would require the “law
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enforcement mentality” mentioned earlier as opposed to a “warrior mentality”
useful in fighting true military opponents. It would seem to be a no-win situation:
military used for domestic policing pose a risk to the populace if they exhibit the
warrior mentality and yet if they shift to the law enforcement mentality they may
lose effectiveness as soldiers. As Shemella noted, “Military personnel who must
perform both traditional and nontraditional missions risk becoming less capable at
both.” 113
Domestic roles for the military may also be problematic for civil-military
relations. It is necessary for good civil-military relations that the public have
confidence in the military as well as believe in the legitimacy of the military.
Militaries whose main focus is abroad tend to receive public support. In contrast,
the “Fire Fighters” and “Police Officers” tend to have poor public support, as
when the police and military act in the same roles both groups tend to become
weak as they cannot concentrate on specific tasks, and this leads to poor military
performance which may undermine public confidence. 114
When they utilize the military domestically, whether on an ongoing basis
or just in times of crisis, countries also increase the chances of military intervention
in domestic politics. Domestic operations unavoidably involve the military in
political disputes. It has also been suggested that:
“1) The likelihood of military intervention rises should the armed forces
become heavily involved in primarily domestic, police type or
counterinsurgency activities.
113
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2) The likelihood of military intervention rises should the armed forces be
ordered, contrary to the advice of the officer corps, to use coercion against
domestic opponents of the government.” 115
In fact, almost two thirds of successful military coups in Latin America from 19071966 were correlated with times of public unrest. 116

Effects of the Changing Security Environment
The “traditional” division of roles among security forces is being
challenged by changes in what is referred to as the “security” or “threat
environment.” These changes have endangered civilian control of the military
and military personnel themselves. With the end of the Cold War, there has been
more domestic than interstate political violence. 117 Combating these “new”
security problems, such as drug trafficking and terrorism, has resulted in many
nations, even those with strong police forces, using military forces to assist in
these efforts or combining the military forces’ abilities with civilian security
efforts. Either route can diminish the demarcation between civil and military
matters. 118 This shift has been more prominent in less developed countries, but
the emergence of terrorism as major security issue for developed countries is
forcing this shift in those countries as well. 119
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While terrorism suddenly became America’s prime security focus after
9/11, many other Western industrialized and “democratic” nations have faced the
threat of terrorists operating within their borders for much longer. There may be
lessons in examining their reactions to these internal threats. One of those appears
to be that military involvement is not necessarily the only option and that there
are severe risks in using the military in a domestic counter-terrorist campaign both
for democracy and the chances of neutralizing the threat.
Counter-terrorist activities based solely on military repression have very
little chance of success. In fact, the only successful campaigns of military
repression against terrorist groups occurred in the “dirty wars” in Argentina and
Peru in which there were large scale human rights violations. As Rasmussen
points out, “Through studies on the life histories of former terrorists we have
learnt that repression will only strengthen the individual terrorist's resolve,
increase the group’s cohesiveness, and even encourage the terrorist organization
to stage further acts of violence.” 120
In the 1970s, Italy was faced with terrorist attacks first by right-wing neofascist and then left wing terrorist groups (e. g., the Red Brigades) that resulted in
civilian casualties. Though the initial Italian anti-terrorist efforts were weak and
inefficient, the use of special police investigative units emerged as the most
effective strategy. In addition, the Italian Army is not mentioned in these efforts.
Interestingly, by the time the Red Brigades were basically defeated laws were
120
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passed to demilitarize and unionize the state police (though not the paramilitary
Carbinieri) due to disturbing patterns of police behavior regarding increasingly
violent protests. 121 The Italian case demonstrates that a state does not have to
militarize the fight against internal disorder, but in fact can demilitarize it and that
police tactics can be the most effective method against terrorists.
West Germany, too, was faced with domestic terrorism in the 1970s from
left wing groups such as the Rote Armee Faktion (Red Army Faction) and
Bewegung 2. Juni (Movement 2nd June). By 1974 terrorism was considered a
significant threat to the state. It was the German police that were leading the fight
against terrorism mainly through undercover investigations, technological data
gathering, and enlisting public support. 122
In addition, the attack on the Olympic Village at the 1972 Games in Munich
by the Palestinian terrorist group Black September and the failed hostage rescue
led to the creation of a new elite counter-terrorist unit, GSG-9, 123 which professor
of political science Scott Sigmund Gartner (University of California-Davis) states
“was deliberately formed from the German Border Guard in September 1973,
instead of from the armed forces, so that it could act domestically and
internationally within the perceived legal constraints of the Constitution.” 124
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Instead of violating their own laws by militarizing the situation the Germans
chose to use the police to combat terrorism.
In contrast, in 1969, to put an end to public disorder surrounding Catholic
civil rights protests in Northern Ireland, mainly in order to protect the Catholics
from the Protestants and the Protestant dominated police, the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC), the British government deployed the British Army to
Northern Ireland without a clear mission. Though the troops were initially
welcomed into Catholic neighborhoods, the Army soon initiated a 3 day curfew in
a Catholic neighborhood in order to search for arms, introduced “internment
without charges” that initially was applied only to Catholics, and shot unarmed
Catholic protestors on “Bloody Sunday” an incident which was never adequately
investigated. These repressive actions combined to drive moderate Catholics from
demanding civil rights to demanding independence and supporting the Irish
Republican Army (IRA). Furthermore, the increased violence caused the British to
dismantle the Ulster Parliament and assume governance of the region which was
something the British hoped to avoid.
The British Army wound up assuming responsibility for the counterterrorist campaign, which was mainly directed at the IRA (the Protestant
paramilitaries were considered less of a threat) and maintaining public order. By
the 1980s the police (RUC) were given responsibility for more tasks, but the
military remained as a major player and troop levels remained constant
irrespective of the level of violence.
60

Despite a reputation as one of the world’s most skilled counter-terrorist
organizations, the British Army failed to control the violence. Instead many
adverse effects on the Army, the police and democracy are seen as stemming from
military primacy. The RUC resented the Army’s superior position and
cooperation between the two organizations suffered. It was observed that when
the RUC began assuming more responsibility they had become more militarized
and correspondingly secretive. The engagement also diverted the Army’s
attention from NATO’s defense of Europe. The British government also became
more secretive; in fact it refused to release the rules of engagement laid down for
British soldiers and would not release information on the numbers of deaths from
the conflict. When journalists gained such information elsewhere, they were
threatened with prosecution. Additionally, the government instituted new rules
to try to prevent the prosecution of soldiers for killing civilians which has resulted
in what Maria Rasmussen, characterized as de facto legal immunity. 125
In Israel’s low intensity conflict with Palestinian militants, the difficulty
making detailed policies to deal with the conflict has resulted, according to Kobi
Michael, in the Israeli public and politicians in essence surrendering decision
making authority to the military. 126 Not surprisingly, political scientist Michael C.
Dresch has noted that “domestic violence has been one of the primary precipitants
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of the complete breakdown of civilian control of the military in various
countries.” 127
In addition, operationally, “this transformation places fighters at great risk,
requiring them to conduct missions in dangerous places without overwhelming
force to protect themselves.” 128

Implications of the International Experience
By taking a broad view of the domestic use of the military around the
world, one can deduce a number of implications for the domestic use of the
military in this country. It becomes apparent that there are many different ways
the military and the police can be utilized. Given the different characteristics of
these two types of organizations, the use of the military to perform traditional
police functions can potentially endanger civilians, increase the costs to society of
maintaining the security forces, weaken both the police and the military, worsen
civil-military relations, and increase the likelihood of military intervention in
domestic politics. Finally, worldwide changes in the “security environment” have
challenged the traditional distinction between the roles of the police and the
military, which ultimately endangers both civilian control of the military as well
as the lives of military personnel. While no one country’s experience can be
viewed as directly applicable to the experience of the United States, the analysis of
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the experience of other countries suggests some of the risks of domestic use of the
military.
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Chapter 4

Reform Proposals
Current discussions of the role of the military in a domestic crisis have been
pushed to the fore by the events of September 11th and Hurricane Katrina, as well
as the threat of a global flu pandemic. Proposals for reform range widely in terms
of how much they would change the current system. Of course, in politics each
proposal carried with it the motivations, biases, misrepresentations and
misconceptions of their promoters. In this chapter, I will evaluate proposals
broadly grouped as follows:
•

The use of private military companies to provide security services
during crises.

•

Broadening the military’s authority in a crisis, including changes to
the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).

•

Leaving the PCA as is and making changes within the existing
response framework.

•

Crafting a new law which strictly forbids the military, including the
National Guard, from taking on most domestic law enforcement
duties.
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Use of Private Military Companies
Recently, on the international security scene, there has been proliferation of
Private Military Companies (PMCs). These are mercenaries who, in return for
compensation, offer their security services to a host of entities including private
corporations and the US government. It has been widely reported that they have
been used in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, however, companies such as Blackwater USA, DynCorp, Wackenhut,
Kroll and the Israeli company Instinctive Shooting International deployed
hundreds of armed men to the disaster area. At least in the case of Blackwater,
portions of these private forces got there before most federal agencies and wound
up protecting both private and government property under contract. Blackwater
has sought to contract its services in other disasters, applying for permits and even
meeting with California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger on the subject.
Blackwater emphasizes its flexibility and ability to provide “turnkey” homeland
security services as well as its desire to “serve the country” making claims that it
was not there during Katrina to make a profit. 129
Blackwater’s claims, however, must be taken with a grain of salt because in
the end, Blackwater is a private company that needs to market its services and
make a profit to survive. In addition, it should be noted that the owner of
Blackwater, Erik Prince, is a devoted and politically active member of the
Christian Right. Altruistic motivations or not, Blackwater in fact was receiving
129
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$283,000 a day in government contracts. Some of the company’s claims, such as
arriving in the French Quarter of New Orleans before the Louisiana National
Guard, as well as rescuing 128 people with its own helicopter for free, have been
called into question by military officers. In addition, while Blackwater boasts that
its employees take loyalty oaths to the US Constitution, a private military
company’s personnel are not bound, for example, by the constitutional restrictions
on search and seizure. With that in mind, some commentators have noted that
they could be used as an “extrajudicial enforcement mechanism” much like the
Nazi Brownshirts. 130

Broadening Military Authority and Changing the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)
After September 11th, several prominent public leaders (most notably
President George W. Bush, Senate Armed Services Committee Chair John Warner
(R-VA), 131 and former Senator Gary Hart, 132 ) argued that the PCA, which limits
the role of the military in domestic law enforcement, should be reviewed. Warner
mentioned the idea in 2001 and the Bush administration called for it in 2002,
although by 2003 Bush had backed away from the idea while Warner was still
calling for hearings. 133 After the disastrous response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
there were again calls by Warner and Bush to review the PCA. 134 After Hurricane
130
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Rita, later in 2005, President Bush went beyond calls for the military to be granted
law enforcement power, suggesting that the military also “determine and mobilize
the national assets needed to respond to disaster.” 135 Again in 2005, with the
threat of pandemic influenza, Bush suggested that while Homeland Security
would be in overall control of the response, the military should be in involved in
“enforcing security around quarantined areas,” 136 a law enforcement function.
Many of the writings advocating changes in the PCA to expand the
military’s domestic law enforcement powers neglect or misrepresent important
facts that would otherwise undermine their arguments. For example, some
include a conclusion that military personnel are superior to their civilian
counterparts that is counter-factual. In 2006, Christopher J. Schmidt and David A.
Klinger made the argument that there needed to be an exemption in the PCA for
the military to act in circumstances beyond the capabilities of civilian law
enforcement, especially for military-style assaults by terrorists which, they claim,
police SWAT units cannot handle. As evidence they present the attacks by Islamic
terrorists in Madrid and London in 2005. 137 One cannot, however, construe the
placement of bombs in mass transit systems (which at least one of their own
sources indicate was the modus operandi of the attack) 138 to be a military style
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assault that a SWAT team cannot handle but the military could. The prevention of
such incidents could require a large number of resources acting concertedly over
an extended period of time not a brief use of heavy arms. In addition, the
response to such a terrorist attack after the fact would seldom require a large
amount of firepower.
While Schmidt and Klinger do present evidence of law enforcement being
unable to stop individuals with armored vehicles, they do not present any
convincing evidence that it was something inherent about civilian law
enforcement that made them incapable of stopping those individuals. Rather it
seems that they did not possess specific weapons to disable such vehicles, 139 a
problem that could be fixed rather easily. One could also argue that the time
frame for response, once such a vehicle was being actively used, would probably
not allow for bringing in federal military specialists. Thus the capability to disable
such vehicles should be in the hands of the first responders, i.e., local law
enforcement.
Schmidt and Klinger also present the events of 9/11 and possible future
terrorist attacks as attempts to overthrow the US government. 140 Neither the
actions of 19 hijackers who planned to crash planes into buildings or any
operation by Islamic terrorists in the near future can be thought of as attempts to
overthrow the US government, as they did not and will not (at least in the
foreseeable future) have the capabilities to do so.
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James Pinkerton, in a 2005 opinion piece for USA Today is probably the best
example of the outright bias against civilian responders as compared to the
military. He starts by saying, “When you absolutely, positively, have to get
something done right away -- you call in the military…They are trained to
complete their mission, or die trying. And as Hurricane Katrina made clear, the
rest of the government doesn't hold to such a high standard.” 141 This
characterization of the military as more dedicated than civilian responders flies in
the face of the facts, as thousands of civilian responders have made the ultimate
sacrifice in the line of duty. In the 20th century at least 14,140 law enforcement
officers died in the line of duty and another 824 are known to have died in the
previous century. 142 From 1977 to 2007, 3,933 firefighters died in the line of duty
in the US 143 while 423 fallen EMS providers have been honored by the National
EMS Memorial Service since 1993. 144
James F. Kelly Jr., a former naval officer, in a 2002 article also misrepresents
the facts surrounding the issue. He wrongly claims that the objections that
military personnel are not trained in domestic law enforcement are not important
because police agencies in many ways model themselves after the military and
many police officers are veterans. Neither of these statements has any bearing on
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whether current military personnel have domestic law enforcement training. While
Kelly rightly points out that many military personnel have had training in military
law enforcement roles, 145 he does not mention there are important differences
between military and civilian law enforcement.
John F. Awtrey, Director of the US DOD’s Office of Law Enforcement
Policy and Support, and Jeffery Porter, of the US Army’s Office of the Provost
Marshal General have compared military law enforcement groups to their civilian
equivalents. While they have found many similarities in such as the work
performed, they also found differences in the culture, operations and authority of
the officers most importantly, that these military law enforcement officers may
also be “warriors” with a “national defense mission.”
Another important difference regarding culture is that military law
enforcement officers also enforce a different a special set of laws, the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a complete criminal code plus special laws to
preserve military functionality. 146 In a law review article specifically concerned
with the UCMJ’s influence on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “evolving
standards of decency” and the 8th amendment, law professor Corey R. Yung does
note,
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Part of the militaryʹs special role is that those subject to military law enjoy
differing levels of constitutional protection than do nonmilitary persons.
Members of the military have greater limitations on their constitutional
rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments. 147
This suggests that for whatever similarities exists between civilian and military
law enforcement forces, that military police are used to working in circumstances
where protection of individual rights is less of a concern.
In addition, while Bush and other advocates of allowing the military to
carry out domestic law enforcement have tried to make their proposal sound like
it is a Katrina-related reform; there is no evidence that suggests that the Posse
Comitatus Act in any way hampered the disastrous response to Katrina. 148 In fact
the RAND Corporation report on the Army’s response to Katrina does not
mention the Posse Comitatus Act as causing a problem. 149
Making Changes within the Existing Response Framework
Many commentators do not believe that improving the response to a
domestic crisis requires a change in who is ultimately in charge or in the Posse
Comitatus Act. While many have proposed increasing FEMA’s capabilities which
is extremely important, one must remember FEMA only has 2,600 full time
employees and 4,000 employees on standby for disasters. 150 It does not have the
large amounts of manpower and equipment for operations, which is one of the
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military’s strengths, nor does it provide law enforcement/force protection
services. In addition, other proposals of making changes within the existing
framework are not without their own biases which tend towards military
solutions.
The recommendation by the RAND Corporation, which studied the Army’s
response to Katrina, was to give National Guard units the “federal mission to
conduct homeland security activities.” This broad, new role would include
preparation for Guard units to deploy outside their states and to fill in for units
deployed overseas, the use of air transport, the creation of “10 regional task forces
to work closely with FEMA and other civilian agencies,” and the creation of a pool
of units with extra homeland security training ready to respond to incidents the
number of which “would be defined in light of currently available civilian
responders.” In addition, it also recommended creating a set of predetermined
possible command and control centers one of which would be chosen based on the
incident (during Katrina the response was complicated due to the existence of
multiple centers). 151
The earlier RAND Corporation study “Army Forces for Homeland
Security,” similarly called for an emphasis on the National Guard conducting
homeland security activities (though it made an unclear statement about statutory
changes to allow the Army Reserve to undertake any homeland security mission).
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152

The Commission on the National Guard and the Reserves also emphasized the

role of National Guard and Reserve forces and made recommendations as to how
they could be better utilized. 153 It must be remembered, however, that the RAND
Corporation was hired by the US Army to do research on what the US Army
could do better, and the Commission was tasked with studying the Guard and the
Reserves which may have led their researchers to focus on the problem from those
organizations’ points of view, as opposed to providing a solution that was best for
the nation as a whole.
Many other commentators-e.g., military officials, scholars from the
conservative Heritage Foundation as well as the ACLU-have advocated solutions
centering on the National Guard and restructuring of the military but not a
repeal/modification of the Posse Comitatus Act. Most also emphasize that there is
no problem with the military undertaking non-law enforcement humanitarian and
logistical tasks in a crisis. 154 William Lind who advises the Marines on “Fourth
Generation Warfare” also claims the National Guard should have responsibility
for domestic events but also that the “United States needs to rebuild its tradition
of local self-reliance and look to local police forces and civilian preparedness.” 155
However there is some indication that this side of the debate is also
somewhat biased in favor of the military as many of these commentators have
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some sort of connection to the military, whereas we hear very little from those
connected with civilian responders. For example, the Heritage Foundation held a
panel discussion in 2005 in which participants stressed the role of the National
Guard, three of the participants were former members of the Army but there was
no one with a connection to civilian law enforcement, other public safety
organizations, emergency management or public health. 156

Drafting A New Law Limiting Military Law Enforcement
In sharp contrast to much of the current debate about modifying the Posse
Comitatus Act, there are some who claim that the Act needs to be replaced with a
new law limiting the use of the military in domestic law enforcement. However,
the proposal by Sean Kealy, which will be discussed below, ignores some of the
operational realities of the current situation and assumes that certain
organizations will be able to handle every situation and thus due to its inflexibility
risks being deemed irrelevant in a crisis.
Gary Felicetti and John Luce, argue that the Posse Comitatus Act itself does
not significantly limit military participation in law enforcement activities. They, in
fact, deride the complexity of the related Department of Defense regulations
which they claim have little basis in the actual law and endanger national security
because among other things they “create bizarre situations where the US Navy
perceives itself to have less authority to conduct some national defense missions as
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threats get closer to America.” 157 They also claim the current interpretation of the
Act “is dangerous to American civil liberties and erodes respect for the rule of law.
It holds up the Posse Comitatus Act as a strict legal and quasi-constitutional limit
that is easy to discard or ignore when practical necessity appears to require it.” 158
They instead call for an end to competing legal interpretations of the current Act
and a new debate on how best to protect both America and civil liberties. 159
In 2003, Sean J. Kealy, cited the historical principle of separation of the
military and law enforcement and claimed that the “principle” of the Posse
Comitatus Act has been eroded and is under assault with the “War on Terror.”
Kealy also called for a new law regarding the military’s role in domestic law
enforcement. However, he goes further than Felicetti and Luce by outlining what
that statute should include.
According to Kealy the new statute should be based on several principles.
“First, the statute should clearly state…that, barring an emergency, or in extremely
limited circumstances, the military will not be used to enforce the law and subject
the civilian population to military authority.” 160 He also claims that the law
should clearly state when the military can engage in a law enforcement mission,
which he claims should be based on whether it is a “mission for which it has been
trained and equipped - to deter war and to protect the nation's security
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interests.” 161 In addition, the mission should not harm the military’s preparedness
and the mission should not be taken on unless it cannot be carried out by civilian
law enforcement. He also claims the law should minimize interactions between
military personnel and civilians since that is not what military personnel are
trained for.
Thus, for a multitude of reasons, he suggests that the military’s law
enforcement authority be limited to securing the nation’s maritime and aviation
borders. He also claims that the military should share information it has about
criminal activity with law enforcement but not engage in surveillance of civilians.
Finally, he claims that evidence gained in violation of the new statute should be
excluded from trial, as that limitation would provide a needed deterrent to
violations. 162
Interestingly, again in contrast to much of the debate, Kealy makes the
claim that the National Guard be considered to be the same as the rest of the
military, which ignores some important aspects of the Guard. He notes that
Guard members are primarily trained as soldiers and not in discretion nor in
criminal procedure, and thus may inadvertently violate constitutional rights.
Thus, he suggests a possible division of the Guard into one section trained like
police and dedicated to public safety duties, with another section oriented to
military service overseas. 163
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While Kealy’s proposal may provide some benefits in terms of
specialization and should be considered, he neglects that the nature of the
National Guard makes it different than the active duty military. Being part-time
soldiers, Guard members and reservists for that matter spend most of their time in
the civilian world which gives them a better understanding of and connection
with the civilian population. This combined with the fact that local National
Guard and Reserve forces will return to the area afterwards to live among that
population, may help prevent abuses of civilians. Thus the Guard and Reserve
should be placed in a category distinct from the regular military branches when it
comes to domestic deployment.
Furthermore, Kealy seems to believe that those local organizations
authorized to engage in law enforcement under his law will be able to handle all
situations and never need military assistance, thus his proposed law has a
dangerous lack of flexibility that may lead to the law being ignored by officials in
circumstances where circumstances threaten their ability to preserve law and
order. It must be remembered that in future crises certain resources may have
their capacity reduced (e.g., staff have been called up for overseas military duty,
difficulties with communication and transport, etc.) or be outright incapacitated.
In addition, there might be simultaneous crises in different areas of the country.
Thus, it is possible that civilian law enforcement and the public safety
oriented National Guard units may be incapable of maintaining law and order. In
those circumstances, with Kealy’s law, officials may be tempted to say the law
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does not apply and start handing out law enforcement missions to military forces
ad hoc. If they proceeded that way, they would in essence be making decisions
with important and complex implications for the country in a time of crisis when
by definition they would have less of the time and information necessary to make
truly informed decisions. They would be making these important decisions in
what I have referred to as the “fog of crisis” a variation on the traditional “the fog
of war.”

Conclusions on the Current Debate
After both September 11th and Hurricane Katrina, the debate on the proper
role of the military in a domestic crisis has been pushed to the fore. This debate is
influenced by the current flaws in the country’s response capabilities, and the
historical experiences of the US as well as other societies. There are many
different proposals competing, which can broadly grouped as the use of private
military companies, broadening the military’s authority in a crisis, including
changes to the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), leaving the PCA undisturbed and
making changes within the existing framework, and crafting a new law limiting
the military’s role in domestic law enforcement. Upon examination of these
proposals it becomes clear that the current debate, while raising some important
questions, includes many biases, misrepresentations and misconceptions. Most
notably, there seems to be a widespread bias in the debate in favor of military
solutions.
78

In the final chapter, I will seek to draw from the important questions raised
above and describe my recommendations for an approach that would focus on
using civilian resources whenever possible, allowing for the military to assist with
non-law enforcement missions when necessary and establishing a progressive
protocol for determining what forces will join the law enforcement efforts if local
resources become insufficient.
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Chapter 5
Improving Emergency Response Capabilities
In beginning this thesis, I suggested that America faces a multitude of
threats to its safety and security and that current trends indicate that the severity
of those threats is growing. I have also sought to demonstrate with multiple
examples that our current plans and existing capabilities cannot be counted on to
keep America safe and secure in a domestic crisis while preserving civil liberties
and civilian supremacy. I noted that our existing response capabilities were weak
in many areas and thus questioned our ability to coordinate an effective, unified
response to domestic crisis. I suggested that the domestic missions tasked to our
military are highly varied and that the lack of a clearly defined role for the military
is part of the problem.
In Chapter Two, I reviewed the history of the domestic use of federal
military forces, revealing both the wide range of circumstances in which they were
employed and the wide range of effects of that usage. I suggested that their use
has been at times a force for good to protect constitutional rights, ensure the
administration of justice and assist the threatened and the powerless and yet, at
other times, a force to reassert the role of the powerful at the expense of the less
powerful. They have been used as a resource to back up the limited capabilities of
the states and at other times posed a threat to federalism by overriding state and
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local authority. I also showed that the domestic deployment of federal military
forces has often proved operationally difficult due to a lack of clearly defined role
for the military and the proclivity by some politicians to give the military illdefined missions without any foreseeable end, using the military as a figurative
“band-aid,” instead of getting to the roots of the problems.
In Chapter Three, looking at international examples of the domestic use of
the military, I introduced the distinction between law enforcement which is
oriented at service to a local population and the minimal use of force and the
military which is traditionally tasked with the fighting of wars which at least
traditionally did not include much interaction with civilians. I also suggested that
the use of the military domestically, in the “traditional” realm of the police, can
potentially risk the lives of civilian and military personnel, increase the costs to
society of maintaining the security forces, weaken both the police and the military,
and worsen civil-military relations, increasing the chance of military intervention
in domestic politics.
In Chapter Four, I reviewed recent proposals for changes to the way the
military is used domestically, sparked for the most part by the failures of effective
response to Hurricane Katrina and international terrorism such as September 11th.
I suggested that seemingly disparate proposals such as the use of private military
companies to provide security services during crises, or broadening the military’s
authority in a crisis, or including changes to the Posse Comitatus Act or leaving
the PCA as is but making changes within the existing response framework, all
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included misrepresentations and misconceptions and most seemed to share a bias
in favor of solutions involving the military as opposed to local resources.
Here I will attempt to propose a better emergency response framework that
avoids many of the difficulties mentioned above and build on some of the positive
suggestions noted at the end of Chapter Four. This new law and framework of
response should be crafted with the following goals:
•

Ensure national security by maintaining the military’s ability to fight wars
and ensure continuity of government.

•

Maintain civilian supremacy and prevent the intrusion of the military into
domestic politics.

•

Ensure domestic security i.e. protecting life and property, maintaining law
and order, and ensuring the continuity and restoration of government
functions.

•

Protect individual civil liberties.

•

Maintain the ability to respond to, in homeland security parlance, “all
hazards.”

This last point is important because if the new law does not give officials the
means to respond to extreme situations, when one of those situations occurs the
likely response of government officials would be to claim the law does not apply
to that situation. They would then make difficult decisions about the appropriate
role of the military in “the fog of crisis” (a phrase inspired by the notion of the
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“fog of war”) instead of in the calmer and information-rich atmosphere of normal
policymaking where time is not of the essence.
In order to accomplish these goals, the primary considerations should be, as
Kealy says, to: (1) use the military for domestic missions that are similar to their
traditional primary missions, and (2) to avoid the use of the military for other
missions.
The best way to deal with the complexity in differentiating between those two
considerations would be to act in the following areas:
•

Increase the response capabilities of civilian agencies particularly civilian
law enforcement.

•

Restrict the military to a support role in domestic crises and only in
situations where civilian agencies are overwhelmed.

•

Split the National Guard into public safety and combat components. 164

•

Maintain the ability to respond to all hazards by establishing a hierarchy of
responsibility for force protection and law enforcement.

Using the Military for Missions Aligned with Its Primary Purpose
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the US military’s traditional primary role is that
of fighting large scale conventional wars (although for the Coast Guard it also
includes maritime safety and security). In fact it has been noted that the “defining
moment” for the US military was the conventional warfare of War World II and
164
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the preparations for war with the USSR. While Vietnam did not fit that model of
warfare, “The great lesson of Vietnam for the US military was a refusal to ever
again fight a limited war against irregular forces.” 165 However, the long term
impact of the “War on Terror” and Iraq where it seems the military has been given
militarily ill-defined missions without any foreseeable end has yet to be seen.
While large scale combat is not likely to occur in the United States in the
near future, Kealy points out that some of the functions the military carried out in
pursuit of its primary missions may be useful domestically while comporting with
the military’s existing mission, not hindering military preparedness, meeting
needs that cannot be easily met by civilian law enforcement, and have limited
contact with civilians. Obviously the Coast Guard’s maritime safety and security
mission falls into that category. The Navy’s mission includes the prevention of
maritime-based threats attacking the United States, and thus it should be allowed
to assist the Coast Guard in intercepting those threats should the need arise. 166
However, the use of Coast Guard detachments on board Navy ships for boarding
other ships in a law enforcement operation should continue as Coast Guardsmen
are specialists in maritime law enforcement.
The Air Force’s mission to defend America from airborne threats should
allow it and other military aircraft to take action against, for example, planes
attempting to smuggle contraband into the US 167 or a hijacked airliner still in the
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air to prevent it from being used as a missile. In addition, as Tim Edgar, the
counsel for national security at the American Civil Liberties Union points out,
there are many tasks performed by the military in war (and in the Coast Guard’s
maritime safety and security mission) that do not require the use of force but may
be useful in a response to a domestic crisis. 168 These include but may not be
necessarily limited to, logistics, medical support, search and rescue, response to
Weapons of Mass Destruction (e.g. decontamination), and engineering. In fact,
military personnel performing these roles may in fact increase military
preparedness for a war as, for example, air crews that have the real life experience
performing search and rescue after a natural disaster should be better prepared to
rescue downed pilots in a war.

Avoiding the Use of the Military for Other Functions
All efforts should be made to avoid using the military for non-military
missions, most prominently those that involve interactions with civilians that
could require search and seizure or the use of force, namely law enforcement or
force protection. As Kealy points out, this will serve to maintain military
readiness, bolster domestic security, and protect military and civilian lives as well
as individual civil liberties. Military forces performing missions that involve the
minimal use of force may detract from their ability to fight wars. In addition, most
military personnel are not trained in rules of evidence and proper police
168
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procedure concerning search and seizure, plus, as mentioned earlier, even military
law enforcement may not have as much experience with civilian laws which evoke
a greater concern for individual rights. They may make mistakes while
conducting actions resulting in the evidence they gained being inadmissible at
trial, leading to dangerous offenders being released back into society. In fact,
former federal prosecutor, Bruce Fein claimed, “the military "would probably
botch an effective prosecution [of a crime]." 169 At the same time, limiting the
military’s role helps preserve civil liberties by reducing potential violations of
civilians’ constitutional rights to not be arrested or searched without probable
cause. 170 In addition, since private military companies are not bound by the
Constitution at all, 171 their use must be strictly prohibited.
Perhaps most importantly, preventing the military from performing these
missions protects the lives of civilians and military personnel alike. Civilian police
are trained to maintain law and order as well as preserve their own lives and the
lives of others with the minimum use of force, but as Rasmussen mentioned that is
a “foreign concept” to soldiers. Having military personnel perform missions that
require the minimal use of force raises the likelihood of tragedy in that personnel
may revert back to their training and unnecessarily take the life of a civilian,
which could have easily happened in the situation involving the phrase “cover
me” described in the introduction.
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Conversely, trying to avoid overuse of force in what will necessarily be
situations unique to soldiers may lead them to hesitate at the wrong moment
resulting in the death of themselves or others. In a similar vein, Major General
Marvin L. Covault, commander of all military forces in Los Angeles during the
1992 riots was criticized for giving military personnel very restrictive rules of
engagement which, critics claim, put soldiers at risk. This is not to say these
tragedies do not happen when police officers perform their duties but they are
specially trained to minimize the chances of a tragedy.

Increasing Civilian Capabilities
It is also necessary to increase the capabilities of individual civilians and the
civilian agencies that deal with domestic security, most notably civilian law
enforcement. If private citizens can become more educated and trained in matters
relating to domestic security, they can help to reduce the burden on response
agencies by following orders regarding evacuation, assisting with the evacuations
of their neighbors who may have special needs and being properly prepared with
their own emergency supplies. Also, if through expanding the existing
Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), more citizens can be trained in
providing first aid and light search and rescue within their communities, more
lives could be saved in cases where help might be slow in coming and the burden
on professional responders will be lessened.
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If the capabilities of civilian response agencies in general are increased, not
only will America be better prepared to respond (even if large portions of the
military are deployed overseas) but it will reduce the number of situations in
which military assistance to civil authorities will be necessary. This will have
benefits in reducing the burden on the military and letting it concentrate more on
its primary missions and reducing the chances of military being drawn into
political disputes.
Finally, enhancing the response capabilities of civilian law enforcement will
reduce the chances that officials will feel the need to use the military in the
situations better handled by civilian law enforcement mentioned above. Given the
incidents in San Diego and Colorado mentioned previously, civilian law
enforcement should be given the resources necessary to effectively counter
armored vehicles. Not only should already over-stretched local police
departments receive additional funding and support but the ability to move local
and state law enforcement officers to other jurisdictions where they are needed in
a crisis must be developed. While the Attorney General can deploy federal law
enforcement officers upon request from state governors (see Chapter One), the US
would also benefit from the development of special teams of state and local law
enforcement officers trained to respond to WMD or other major incidents and civil
disturbances.
A good example is Suffolk County, New York’s Crisis Action Team which
is capable of responding to large-scale incidents, such as plane crashes, civil
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disturbances and Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents. 172 Its members could
be temporarily deputized as US Marshals when deployed by the Attorney
General. (Hereafter, when referring to these hypothetical teams, I will use the term
Crisis Action Teams). Currently, a similar capacity exists in the area of search and
rescue with the FEMA Urban Search and Rescue teams described earlier,
composed of local emergency service personnel who respond to structural
collapses and other major incidents nationwide. 173
Creation of such teams would not only provide more law enforcement
resources in a crisis but would also provide a subsidy to participating local and
state law enforcement agencies by providing their members extra training thereby
enhancing the area’s local resources. This in turn could further enhance local
police capabilities as Cameron pointed out the Suffolk County team not only
improved officers involved at their normal patrol duties, but these officers helped
spread knowledge to other officers in their precincts. 174

Restricting the Military Role
It is also important to ensure the current publicized policy of using the
military in support of civilian authorities, only when civilian agencies request
assistance because they are overwhelmed, and with immediate withdrawal of
military forces once civilian authorities are capable of handling a situation on their
172
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own, continues. This will not only help reduce the burden on the military by
limiting the number of domestic missions it is asked to perform, but also reduce
the danger of military forces being drawn into political disputes and interfering in
domestic politics, which Welch showed to have occurred in Latin America where
the military often takes on domestic missions. 175

Splitting the National Guard
There would also be benefits to splitting the National Guard into two
components, one purely for domestic service that cannot be sent overseas and
would be oriented towards public safety, the other eligible for overseas service
oriented towards warfare. In fact, approximately 22 states and Puerto Rico have
State Defense Forces or State Guard units that cannot be federalized which,
Lieutenant Colonel Brent C. Bankus of the US Army War College points out, could
be used as the basis for a domestic component in those states, 176 (from here
onward I will refer to these domestic units as State Guard units). This would be
beneficial in allowing units to specialize in the different skills of policing or
fighting wars and it would ensure that units necessary for domestic security are
not deployed overseas when needed at home a concern raised by many including
political scientist Brett Morris of the University of Alabama. 177
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Furthermore, splitting the Guard functions would be more advantageous
than creating a new reserve force to carry out homeland security missions, as the
National Guard/State Guards have already built up an expertise in dealing with
domestic incidents. Many of the Guardsmen called up for the Rodney King riots
in LA 1992 had been deployed in LA for the Watts riots in 1965, as well as
assisting civilian law enforcement during natural disasters. 178 The institutional
experience of the Guard in these areas is invaluable and all efforts should be made
to keep from losing it, thus the Guard should continue to play a role in these types
of situations. Furthermore, there is no need to reinvent the wheel; the National
Guard has already built up units specifically for homeland security, 179 so why
dismantle them? Finally, given that they will be able to specialize the State
Guards will hopefully move farther towards police mentality, training etc.

Maintaining the Ability to Respond to All Hazards
Though the aim of this new approach is to avoid the use of the military
when it is not needed and in particular to avoid the use of the military in domestic
law enforcement (with the exception of the Coast Guard’s unique mission), we
cannot foresee all possible future crises and what resources may be weakened,
destroyed or otherwise rendered unavailable by a crisis. In some of these cases,
the situation may exceed the capabilities of civilian law enforcement. In these
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cases it is vital to have a plan regarding what forces to rely on next, rather than
have government officials decide that the law does not apply to a particular
situation. As I noted previously, leaders with no set protocol may then make
decisions about the appropriate role for the military that will potentially lead into
the problems seen in the past (e.g., adverse affects on continuity of government,
civil liberties, American lives etc.). The reason being that they will necessarily
make those decisions in “the fog of crisis,” when they do not have the time or
abilities to collect and examine the evidence nor think through the potential
consequences.
This new approach should spell out a pre-determined progression of forces
depending upon how much law enforcement/force protection is needed and the
qualities each separate force possesses. Put simply, if the first level of law
enforcement/force protection proves or promises to be insufficient in the eyes of
the responsible civilian official they will be supplemented by the next level and so
on until the situation is contained. Below, in Table 3, is a graphic presentation of
my recommended progression of forces with the strengths and weaknesses of each
of the ten levels of response listed with it to explain its position in the progression.
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Table 3: Recommended Progression of Forces

Local and State Law Enforcement
Strengths: Mainly full time law enforcement experience, live in the civilian world, are connected to the area.
Weaknesses: May lack special training for complex, large scale incidents.

Federal Law Enforcement and Crisis Action Teams (CATs)
Strengths: Full time law enforcement experience, live in the civilian world and CATs are specially trained for
policing complex, large scale incidents.
Weaknesses: Not from the area.

State Guard from that State
Strengths: Live in the civilian world, are specially trained for policing complex, large scale incidents, are from
the area.
Weaknesses: No full time law enforcement experience.

State Guards from other States
Strengths: Live in the civilian world, and are specially trained for policing complex, large scale incidents.
Weaknesses: No full time law enforcement experience, not from the area.

Military Police from in-state National Guard and Reserve Units
Strengths: Live in the civilian world, trained in law enforcement, from area.
Weaknesses: No full time law enforcement experience, may not be specifically trained in policing complex,
large scale incidents, may not be accustomed to an emphasis on individual rights.

Military Police from out-of-state National Guard and Reserve Units
Strengths: Live in the civilian world, trained in law enforcement.
Weaknesses: No full time law enforcement experience, may not be specifically trained in policing complex,
large scale incidents, not from the area, may not be used to an emphasis on individual rights.
Military Police from Active Duty Units
Strengths: Full time law enforcement experience, trained in law enforcement.
Weaknesses: May not specifically trained in policing complex, large scale incidents, not from the area, do not
live in the civilian world, may not be used to an emphasis on individual rights

Non-MP in-state National Guard and Reserves from other States
Strengths: Live in the civilian world., from the area
Weaknesses: Not trained in law enforcement, not from the area.

Non-MP out of-state National Guard and Reserve Units
Strengths: Live in the civilian world,.
Weaknesses: Not trained in law enforcement, not from the area.

Non-MP Active Duty Military Forces
Strengths: Few or none compared with other security forces, but are trained in the use of arms and are
disciplined.
Weaknesses: Not trained in law enforcement, do not live in the civilian world, not from the area.
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If during the incident a more appropriate unit becomes available, reasonable effort
should be made to attempt to replace the less appropriate unit with one better
suited to the tasks. Similarly, as the situation improves the first units removed
should be the less appropriate units lower in the chain.

Conclusion
Recently, America has had difficulty in responding adequately to highprofile domestic crises. Given the gravity of potential domestic crises facing the
US, it is only natural to question whether the country is adequately prepared to
handle a large-scale incident. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests despite the
efforts of many, that the US will be woefully unprepared to keep America safe and
secure while still maintaining civilian supremacy and individual civil liberties
when a crisis erupts.
As argued, one reason for this is the lack of a clear, legally defined role for
the domestic use of the military which complicates response efforts, hampers the
ability of authorities to plan for emergencies and heightens the possibility of the
abuse of the less powerful. The experiences of other countries are highly
informative on the problems of defining the military’s domestic role and limiting
heavily involvement in domestic affairs, but will not provide a cookie-cutter
solution for the US. Furthermore, many of the current proposals are beset by
biases and misconceptions.
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Thus I have proposed several reforms, including a new framework of
response that could be incorporated into law to remedy this situation. The key
elements of this proposal are that the military should be used for missions similar
to its primary traditional mission of fighting wars and that their use for other
purposes should be avoided. Limiting military involvement to its traditional
mission can be achieved by increasing civilian capabilities, restricting the military
to supporting civilian authorities only when civilian authorities are overwhelmed
and request help, and splitting the National Guard into domestic and overseas
functions. The response framework suggested above allows officials to maintain
appropriate law enforcement and force protection in all types of hazardous
situations by giving them a pre-established progression of forces upon which to
rely. Having the progression established in advance will help increase
coordination and communication in preparation and response. Too often in the
past, important decisions have been made in the “fog of crisis.” My proposal
seeks to put robust plans in place before a crisis occurs, and to organize those
plans in a simple logical progression that maximizes the probability of their
successful use.
As crises multiply and dangers grow, America deserves and requires no
less.

95

Bibliography
Ackerman, Spencer. “Coup de Grace.” New Republic 223, no. 18 (2005): 11‐12.
AP Photos, “People watched as National Guard troops moved about the area outside the
Louisiana Superdome in New Orleans on Friday,” Hurricane Katrina ‐ Military
Presence, boston.com,
http://www.boston.com/news/weather/gallery/katrina_military (accessed April 16,
2009).
Associated Press. “Military Called Unprepared for Attack.” The New York Times,
February 1, 2008.
Awtrey, John F. and Jeffery Porter, “Civilian and Military Law Enforcement
Cooperation.” The Police Chief 71, no. 2 (2004).
Bankus, Brent C. “Homeland Defense: The Pennsylvania State Guard: 1941‐1953.”
Military Review 84, no. 3 (2004): 56‐58.
Barry, Dan. “Three Years After the Hurricane the Backup is a Fixture.” New York Times,
August 24, 2008.
Beveridge, Reid K. “The Bulwark of Civilian Supremacy.” Armed Forces Journal 140
(2002): 22‐24.
Bolgiano David G. “Military Support of Domestic Law Enforcement Operations.” FBI
Law Enforcement Bulletin 70 (2001).
Borut, Donald J. “Call It a Crisis When the Heroes of 9‐11 Are Being Laid Off.” Nation’s
Cities Weekly 26 (2003): 2.
Bruneau, Thomas C. “Introduction” in Bruneau, Who Guards the Guardians and How, 1‐17.
Bruneau, Thomas C. ed. Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil‐Military
Relations. (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006).
Cameron, Stuart K. “Suffolk County’s Crisis Action Team: A Mobile Field Force for the
Twenty First Century.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (2006): 1‐7.
Center for Catastrophe Preparedness & Response and the American Red Cross in Greater
New York. How Prepared Are We, New York?‐Executive Summary, 2006. New York:
CCPR, 2006.

96

Citizen Corps, CERT: Community Emergency Response Team: Directory of Community
Emergency Response Team Programs by State, Citizen Corps,
https://www.citizencorps.gov/cc/CertIndex.do?submitByState (accessed April 16,
2009).
Citizen Corps. CERT: Community Emergency Response Team: About CERT. Citizen Corps.
http://www.citizencorps.gov/cert/about.shtm (accessed April 16, 2009).
CNN.com, “Bombs were Spanish‐made explosives,” March 13, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/03/12/spain.blasts/ (accessed
November 20, 2008).
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and
Reserves into a 21st‐Century Operational Force. Executive Summary of the Final
Report. Washington, DC: 2008.
DʹAgostino, Joseph A. “Bush Will Review Law on Domestic Use of Military.” Human
Events 58, no. 28 (2002).
Davis, Diane E. and Anthony W. Pereira ed. Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in
Politics and State Formation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Davis, Lois M., Louis T. Mariano, Jennifer E. Pace, Sarah K. Cotton, and Paul Steinberg.
“Combating Terrorism: How Prepared Are State and Local Response
Organizations?.” Research Brief for RAND National Security Research Division (2006):
1‐3.
Davis, Lynn E., David E. Mosher, Richard Brennan, K. Scott, McMahon, Michael D.
Greenburg, and Charles W. Yost. “An Army Strategy for Homeland Security”
Research Brief for the RAND Arroyo Center (2004): 1‐3.
Davis, Lynn E., Jill Rough, Gary Cecchine, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, and Laurinda L.
Zeman. “Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations.” Report
for RAND Arroyo Center, for the US Army (2007): 1‐83.
Dickinson, Paul and Thomas B. Allen. “Marching on History.” Smithsonian 33 (2003): 84‐
95.
Doyle, John M. “Be Prepared.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 163, no. 15 (2005).
Dresch, Michael C. Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment.
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
97

Editorial Staff. “False Victory at the Border.” The New York Times, July 5, 2008.
Felicetti, Gary and John Luce, “The Posse Comitatus Act: Liberation from the Lawyers,”
Parameters, (2004): 94‐107.
FEMA, About FEMA, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/about/index.shtm (accessed, April 15,
2009).
FEMA, Are You Ready?, FEMA,
http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/basic_preparedness.shtm and
http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/assemble_disaster_supplies_kit.shtm
(accessed, April 16, 2009)
Floyd, Craig W. “A Record of Law Enforcement’s Sacrifice during the 20th Century.”
National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, National Law Enforcement
Officers Memorial Fund.
http://www.1nleomf.com/TheMemorial/Facts/CenturySacrifice.htm.
Frater, Elisabeth. “Whoa! Keep the Reins Tight on that Posse.” National Journal 33. no. 42
(2001).
Gartner, Scott Sigmund. “Todayʹs Germans Atone for the Holocaust; Sending Troops
Abroad.” New York Times, July 23, 1994.
Garza, Mannie. “DMATs in Danger.” The Journal of Emergency Medical Services 33 (2008):
26‐27.
Goldstein, Robert J. Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present.
Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1978.
Grimshaw, Allen D. “Actions of Police and the Military in American Race Riots.” Phylon
24, no. 3 (1963): 271‐289.
Heritage Foundation Event. “The Military’s Role in Disasters: What’s the Right Answer.”
Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Press/Events/ev100305c.cfm.
Hsu, Spencer S. and Ann Scott Tyson. “Pentagon to Detail Troops to Bolster Domestic
Security.” Washington Post, December 1, 2008.
Kealy, Sean J. “Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law
Enforcement.” Yale Law & Policy Review (Spring 2003): 1‐17.

98

Kelly, James F. Jr. “Broaden Armed Forcesʹ Roles At Home and Abroad.” US Naval
Institute Proceedings 128, no. 10 (2002): 2.
Lewis, Neil A. “Memos Reveal Scope of Power Bush Sought in Fighting Terror.” New
York Times, March 2, 2009.
Martin, Douglas. “Woodrow Mann Dies at 85; Sought Troops in Little Rock.” New York
Times, August 9, 2002.
Martin, Terry. “Munich Massacre Remembered.” Europe 410 (2001): 43.
Maynes, Robert. “FDNY IMTs‐Some Background.” With New York Firefighters, no. 1
(2008): 14‐15.
Michael, Kobi. “Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control in the Reality of Low
Intensity Conflict—The Israeli Case.” Israel Studies 12, no. 1 (2007): 28‐52.
Millett, Richard L. “Creating Security Forces in Latin America.” Joint Forces Quarterly, no.
42 (2006) 14‐16.
Moniz, Dave and Matt Kelly. “Military’s Role in Disasters Reconsidered: Senator Wants
to Review Law that Limits Troops Use.” USA Today, September 19, 2005.
Morris, Brett. “National Guard Dedication to Homeland Defense: A Needed Emphasis in
a Storm of Conflict.” Paper presented at annual meeting of the Midwestern
Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 2004.
Morris, David. “Warner My Revisit Ban on Domestic Police Power.” CongressDaily, April
21, 2003.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Final Report of
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States‐Executive Summary,
2004. Washington, DC: GPO, 2004.
National EMS Memorial Service. National EMS Memorial Service: Press and Media Info.
National EMS Memorial Service. http://nemsms.org/press.htm (accessed April 16,
2009).
National Guard Bureau. “The National Guard’s Role in Homeland Defense.” The
National Guard. http://www.ngb.army.mil/features/homelanddefense/index.html
(accessed October 8, 2008).
Newman, Richard J. “Unwinnable War,” U.S. News & World Report, November 4, 1996.
99

New York Times, “News Summary and Index,” July 30, 1967.
Pinkerton, James. “Send in the Troops.” USA Today, October 10, 2005.
Pollack, Michael. “Security Patrols.” The New York Times, November 25,2007.
Rasmussen, Maria J. M. “The Military Role in Internal Defense and Security: Some
Problems.” Occasional paper, The Center for Civil‐Military Relations, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 1999.
Reiter, Herbert and Klaus Weinhauer. “Police and Political Violence in the1960s and
1970s: Germany and Italy in a Comparative Perspective.” European Review of
History 14 (2007): 373‐395.
Roxborough, Ian. “The Ghost of Vietnam.” in Davis and Pereira, Irregular Armed Forces,
346‐381.
Scahill, Jeremy. Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army. New
York: Nation Books, 2007.
Schmidt, Christopher J. and David A. Klinger. “Altering the Posse Comitatus Act.”
Creighton Law Review 39 (2006): 667‐693.
Shemella, Paul. “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” in Bruneau,
Who Guards the Guardians and How, 122‐145.
Shogan, Robert. “A Powder Keg Ready to Blow.” American History 42 (2007): 60‐67.
Skelton, William B. Review of The Demands of Humanity: Army Medical Disaster Relief, by
Gaines M. Foster. American Historical Review 90, no. 1 (1985): 230‐231.
Steele, Shelby. “The Legacy of Little Rock.” Wall Street Journal September 25, 2007.
The Journal of Emergency Medical Services. “Last MAST Unit Deploys.” 33 (2008): 27.
The Military’s Role in Disasters: What’s the Right Answer. Video of Heritage Foundation
Panel Discussion, (10/03/05). http://www.heritage.org/Press/Events/ev100305c.cfm
The Times, “Britain ʹdefiantʹ as bombers kill 52 in attack on the heart of London,” July, 8
2005. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article541666.ece (accessed
November 20, 2008).
Trebilcock, Craig T. “The Myth of Posse Comitatus.”
100

Turbiville, Jr., Graham H. “US‐Mexican Border Security.” Military Review 79, no. 4 (1999):
29‐40.
US Department of Homeland Security. National Response Framework. Washington, DC:
GPO, 2008.
US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance. FYs 2007/2008 JAG State Allocation
Comparisons. US Department of Justice.
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/08JAGstateallocations.pdf (accessed April 16,
2009).
US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Technical Report: Local Law
Enforcement Block Grant Program, 1996‐2004, by Lynda Bauer, 2004. Washington,
DC: GPO, 2004.
US Fire Administration. USFA Firefighter Fatalities Historical Overview. US Fire
Administration.
http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/fireservice/fatalities/statistics/history.shtm (accessed
April 16, 2009).
US Marshals Service. “The U.S. Marshals and the Integration of the University of
Mississippi.” James Meredith. US Marshals Service.
http://www.usmarshals.gov/history/miss/02.htm (accessed April 16, 2009).
US Northern Command. “About US Northern Command.” US Northern
Command:Defending Our Homeland, US Northern Command.
http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html (accessed October 8, 2008).
US Northern Command. “U.S. Northern Command, Canada Command establish new
bilateral Civil Assistance Plan.” US Northern Command: Defending Our Homeland.
US Northern Command. http://www.northcom.mil/News/2008/021408.html
(accessed October 8, 2008).
US Northern Command.“US NORTHCOM News.” US Northern Command: Defending Our
Homeland. US Northern Command,.http://www.northcom.mil/News/index.html
(accessed October 8, 2008).
Verhovek, Sam Howe. “Pentagon Halts Drug Patrols After a Killing at the Border.” New
York Times, July 31, 1997.

101

Watson, Bryan D. “A Look Down the Slippery Slope: Domestic Operations Outsourcing
and the Erosion of Military Culture” Air & Space Power Journal (Spring 2008): 93‐
104.
Weiner, Tim. “A Nation at War: The Mexican Border; U.S. and Mexico Coordinate
Military Efforts for Mutual Protection Against Terror.” New York Times, March 23,
2003.
Weinraub, Bernard. “Bush Considers Calling in Guard To Fight Drug Violence in
Capital.” New York Times, March 21, 1989.
Welch, Claude E. and Arthur K. Smith. Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil Miltary
Relations. North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1974.
Wilson, Frederick T. Mass Violence in America: Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances. Edited
by. Robert M. Fogelson and Richard E. Rubenstein. New York: Arno Press & The
New York Times, 1969.
Yung, Corey R. “Is Military Law Relevant to the “Evolving Standards of Decency
Emodied in the Eighth Amendment?” Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy
103, (2008): 140‐145.

102

